Turkey’s Expanding Red Sea Strategy: Defence Ties, Somalia and the Gulf of Aden
Turkey’s defence relationship with Saudi Arabia and its long-standing security partnership with Somalia place Ankara in an increasingly consequential position across the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.
Turkey’s Strategic Return to the Red Sea
ANKARA — Turkey’s ratification of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is another indication of Ankara’s expanding regional security relationships. The agreement does not create a new Turkish military base in the Red Sea, but it strengthens the diplomatic and defence framework through which Turkey may exercise influence across the wider region.
Signed in August 2026, the pact establishes a collective-defence commitment among the three countries. It also provides for military coordination, intelligence cooperation and stronger defence-industry ties. Turkish parliamentary approval on November 5 moved the agreement closer to implementation.
For Ankara, the agreement adds a Gulf dimension to an already extensive regional policy.
Somalia as an established security partner
Turkey’s presence in Somalia is not new. The two governments signed a ten-year framework agreement on defence and economic cooperation in February 2024. According to Somalia’s government, the framework commits Turkey to help build, train and equip the Somali navy.
Turkey has also maintained a military training and advisory role in Somalia for more than a decade. Its parliament approved a further military deployment mandate in 2024, reflecting Ankara’s continuing security engagement.
These arrangements concern Somalia and should not be confused with the new trilateral pact. They nevertheless demonstrate that Turkey already has established security relationships in the Horn of Africa.
From bilateral ties to regional influence
The strategic question is whether Ankara can connect its relationships across the Gulf and Africa into a more coherent regional policy.
Turkey has interests in maritime security, defence exports, trade routes and political influence. Its closer relationship with Saudi Arabia may give it additional diplomatic weight in Gulf discussions, while its partnership with Somalia provides an existing institutional foothold in the Horn.
But influence should not be mistaken for unrestricted military reach. The Mecca agreement does not automatically authorize Turkish troop deployments to Saudi Arabia. Any deployment would require a separate parliamentary mandate.
Implications for the Horn
For Somaliland, Turkey’s growing regional role warrants careful observation. Hargeisa should assess how Ankara’s relationships with Mogadishu and Gulf capitals may affect diplomatic engagement, maritime security and regional economic cooperation.
The practical response is not to assume that Turkey’s regional diplomacy is directed against Somaliland. It is to develop clear channels for engagement and protect Somaliland’s interests through credible institutions.
Turkey’s return to the centre of regional security discussions is not defined by one agreement. It is the cumulative effect of its defence partnerships, commercial relationships and long-term presence across the Red Sea neighbourhood.
