In a landmark move that has sent waves of optimism across the Republic of Somaliland, the Minister of Interior and Security, Abdalle Mohamed Arab, officially announced a nationwide prohibition on civilians carrying weapons. Effective immediately as of December 20, 2025, the directive signals a decisive shift from a post-conflict society to a modern, rule-of-law state.

Public sentiment in Hargeisa and across the regions has been overwhelmingly positive. From the bustling markets to the digital squares of social media, Somalilanders are expressing a shared sense of relief. This isn’t just about removing hardware from the streets; it is about the maturation of a nation that no longer feels the need to rely on individual arms for protection, trusting instead in the professional institutions of the state.

From Individual Arms to Institutional Trust

The decision by the National Security Committee represents more than just a ban; it is an invitation to join a civilized legal framework. A key component of this transition is the government’s openness to legal registration. Civilians who feel a genuine need for protection can now move through the official channels of the Ministry of Interior to register their arms, ensuring that every piece of hardware in the country is accounted for, documented, and tied to a responsible individual.

This move does away with the informal “labels” and “titles” of the past. There are no special exceptions—only citizens and the law. By centralizing the monopoly on the use of force, the Somaliland government is ensuring that security is a collective public good provided by the state, rather than a fragmented privilege held by a few.

Why This is a Win for Somaliland’s Security

The strategic benefits of this disarmament and registration policy are three-fold:

Deterrence of Petty and Organized Crime: By making it illegal to carry weapons in public spaces, security agencies can now intervene proactively. This reduces the likelihood of impulsive escalations in public disputes and makes it significantly harder for criminal elements to operate under the guise of “armed civilians.”

Investment and Economic Growth: Security is the bedrock of prosperity. As Somaliland continues to position itself as a hub for international investment and Berbera port continues its expansion, a “weapon-free” public environment sends a powerful signal to the global community. It says: Somaliland is safe, stable, and open for business.

Strengthening Social Cohesion: Disarmament levels the playing field. It removes the intimidation factor that can sometimes stifle local commerce and social interaction. When the public sees the government taking “legal action against anyone and anywhere” found with illegal weapons, it reinforces the principle that no one is above the law.

A Government for the People

The Somaliland government’s move is being hailed as a “People-First” security strategy. By cleaning up the security environment ahead of the major milestones of 2026, the administration is prioritizing the safety of the mother, the student, and the trader.

The Minister’s statement was clear: the integrity of the state and the safety of its people are paramount. As the security agencies begin their work to enforce these decisions, they do so with the full wind of public support at their backs. This is a proud day for the Republic—a day where Somaliland chooses the pen, the trade, and the law over the rifle.

Reflection for waryatv.com: This move proves that Somaliland’s greatest strength is its ability to evolve. By moving from a culture of individual defense to a culture of institutional law, the nation is securing its future for generations to come.

Budgets reveal priorities. Today, Somaliland’s lawmakers began dissecting the numbers that will shape 2026.

The Government of Somaliland has formally launched parliamentary scrutiny of its 2026 fiscal plans, as the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development presented the draft national budget to the Economic, Finance, and Trade Committee of the House of Representatives.

Appearing before the committee, Finance Minister Abdillahi Hassan Aden outlined the framework, assumptions, and priorities underpinning the proposed 2026 budget, marking a key procedural step in the annual budget cycle. The presentation signals the transition from executive planning to legislative oversight, where revenue projections and spending priorities face detailed examination.

The minister was joined by senior officials from the ministry, including Director General Mohamed Hassan Salebaan, Accountant General Hassan Muse Khalif, and several departmental directors. Together, they delivered a comprehensive briefing to lawmakers on the structure of the budget, which is currently under review by the House of Representatives.

Committee members focused their questioning on core fiscal issues, including budget management procedures, expenditure allocations, and projected revenue streams for the coming year. According to officials present, the ministry responded in detail, clarifying how funds are expected to be mobilized and distributed across government sectors in 2026.

The exchange reflects growing parliamentary engagement with fiscal policy, at a time when Somaliland faces rising demands on public spending alongside pressures to strengthen domestic revenue collection. While no figures were publicly disclosed during the session, lawmakers signaled particular interest in how the government plans to balance development needs, recurrent expenditures, and fiscal discipline.

In its closing remarks, the Economic, Finance, and Trade Committee praised the Ministry of Finance for the clarity and preparedness of its presentation. Committee members stressed that effective cooperation between the executive branch and the legislature remains essential to ensuring that the national budget aligns with public needs and national priorities.

The draft budget will now move into a broader deliberation phase within parliament, where additional hearings and debates are expected in the coming weeks before a final vote. Any amendments proposed by lawmakers will be considered before the budget is returned to the executive for implementation.

As Somaliland enters this critical stage of budget review, the 2026 fiscal plan is shaping up to be more than a technical exercise. It is an early test of how transparently resources are allocated, how accountable institutions remain, and how effectively economic policy translates into tangible outcomes for the public.

Not rhetoric. Not projections. Independent data now shows Berbera Port is cutting costs, creating jobs, and anchoring Somaliland’s economy.

On the sunbaked Gulf of Aden coastline, the cranes towering over Berbera Port signal more than an infrastructure upgrade. They mark a structural shift in how Somaliland connects to regional and global trade—and how frontier economies can change trajectory when capital, governance, and strategy align.

A newly released independent evaluation commissioned under the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and British International Investment (BII) provides the most detailed empirical assessment to date of the DP World–BII investment in Berbera Port. Its conclusion is unambiguous: the expansion is already delivering measurable economic, trade, and environmental gains for Somaliland, with broader regional implications still unfolding

Before the expansion, Berbera was constrained by shallow draft, limited quay length, and slow vessel turnaround. Phase 1 of the project, completed in 2021, fundamentally altered that equation. Container handling capacity increased from 150,000 to 500,000 TEU, vessel turnaround times dropped from 64 hours in 2018 to just 25 hours in 2024, and the port is now capable of accommodating significantly larger ships—driving down per-unit shipping costs through scale efficiencies

Those operational gains translate directly into economic impact. The study estimates that in 2024 alone, transport cost reductions linked to the port expansion reached $8.4 million, with net savings of $6.9 million after accounting for new users attracted to the port. For import-dependent Somaliland, where logistics costs feed directly into consumer prices, those savings are not abstract—they shape daily economic reality.

The benefits extend inland. Economic modelling shows Berbera has become cost-competitive for parts of eastern Ethiopia and Somaliland previously underserved by the Addis Ababa–Djibouti corridor, particularly regions beyond the effective reach of the railway. As a result, trade is gradually rerouting from Djibouti to Berbera, strengthening Somaliland’s role as a regional gateway rather than a peripheral endpoint.

Inside Somaliland, the numbers are striking. In 2024, the upgraded port and the adjacent Berbera Economic Zone supported an estimated 2,490 jobs and generated $45.1 million in value added. Of that, 921 jobs and $16.7 million were directly attributable to the port expansion itself—equivalent to roughly 0.4 percent of Somaliland’s GDP in a single year. For a small, unrecognized economy with limited access to international finance, that scale of impact is material, not marginal.

There are environmental dividends as well. More efficient operations, shorter shipping times, and larger vessels have reduced carbon emissions by an estimated 7,651 tons annually, underscoring how modern logistics can align economic growth with climate mitigation.

The report is cautious, however, about overstatement. Current trade volumes do not yet require the port’s full capacity, partly due to disruptions from the Red Sea crisis. Nor does the analysis fully capture downstream effects such as lower consumer prices, productivity gains for local producers, or spillovers into Ethiopia. If anything, the authors suggest, the port’s total contribution is likely understated.

Berbera’s lesson is broader than Somaliland. It demonstrates that in fragile or overlooked markets, well-structured infrastructure—anchored by capable operators and long-term capital—can generate outsized returns in efficiency, resilience, and economic sovereignty. In a region where instability is often the norm, Berbera Port is emerging as proof that strategic investment can quietly, but decisively, change the balance.

When a state blurs the line between terrorists and authority, it rarely stops at words. Somalia’s pressure campaign against Somaliland shows what comes next.

In the architecture of counterterrorism, language matters. It signals intent, credibility, and alignment. That is why Somalia’s State Minister of Defense, Omar Ali Abdi, set off alarm bells when he publicly declared that “only two groups are allowed to have weapons: the government, which protects its people, and Al-Shabaab, which kills them.” The remark was later withdrawn, but the damage lingered—made worse by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s separate suggestion that Al-Shabaab members could participate in voter registration “however you want.”

Taken together, these statements reveal more than rhetorical missteps. They expose a dangerous ambiguity at the heart of Somalia’s security posture, one that blurs the line between the state and the terrorist group it is meant to defeat. This confusion comes despite more than a decade of extraordinary international support aimed at dismantling Al-Shabaab. By most measurable standards, that effort is failing.

Al-Shabaab has regained key towns, operates within striking distance of Mogadishu, and continues to adapt tactically and organizationally. In March 2025, the group attempted to assassinate the president. Weeks later, a coordinated attack killed twenty Ugandan peacekeepers. At the same time, Somalia’s federal system is fracturing, with Puntland and Jubaland increasingly estranged from Mogadishu and absent from national security coordination.

Against this backdrop, Somaliland stands in sharp contrast. For 34 years, it has maintained internal security, conducted elections, and managed peaceful transfers of power—without recognition and without the scale of international assistance poured into Mogadishu. Western policymakers have noticed. Quiet discussions in Washington, London, and Brussels increasingly frame Somaliland as a case for structured engagement rather than perpetual neglect.

Instead of learning from this stability, Mogadishu has chosen confrontation—shifting from political pressure to economic coercion. The campaign is systematic. Somalia’s failed electronic travel authorization scheme attempted to impose identity control over travelers to Somaliland before collapsing under U.S. and British warnings of a major data breach. Aviation tensions followed, with competing claims over airspace authority creating uncertainty for airlines in an already volatile region.

The most consequential front is maritime. Somalia’s attempt to impose an Electronic Cargo Tracking Number system on all shipments, including those bound for Berbera Port, is not a neutral regulatory move. It is an effort to centralize trade, customs, and revenue flows under Mogadishu, effectively throttling Somaliland’s economic lifelines under the guise of technical compliance.

This economic warfare carries wider risks. Weaponizing ports and shipping regulations in one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors invites instability, piracy, and exploitation by extremist networks. It also entangles regional and global actors—Turkey, Egypt, China, Qatar, and the UAE—each backing different sides for strategic reasons.

The international community faces a choice. Continue underwriting a Somali government that sends mixed signals on terrorism while destabilizing its most functional neighbor—or recalibrate. That recalibration should include a hard review of aid usage, clear counterterrorism benchmarks, and structured engagement with Somaliland grounded in performance, not politics.

A government cannot defeat extremism while normalizing ambiguity. And it cannot build legitimacy by economically besieging stability. The Horn of Africa cannot afford that contradiction. Neither can the world.

From 1959 to Today: Before Hashtags, Somaliland Was Already Governing Itself.

In 1959, Somaliland stood on the edge of political transformation. Long before social media, 24-hour commentary, or digital outrage cycles, Somalilanders were already engaged in the difficult work of self-government—electing representatives, expanding political institutions, and debating the future of sovereignty with deliberation and purpose.

This was not a symbolic exercise. It was formal politics, grounded in law and documented governance. According to official British records, Somaliland’s Legislative Council was expanded in 1959 to include 36 members, 33 of whom were Somali representatives.

Elections were organized across major towns, and constitutional reforms were debated openly as the territory prepared for independence. Somalilanders were not passive subjects of colonial administration; they were active political actors shaping their own future.

“By 1959, the Legislative Council was expanded to 36 members, with 33 Somali representatives.” — Somaliland Protectorate Report, 1958–1959.

These developments culminated in Somaliland’s independence on 26 June 1960—an achievement rooted not in sudden upheaval, but in years of institutional preparation and political engagement. The decisions made in that period, including the choice to unite with Italian-administered Somalia days later, continue to shape political debates today. Whatever one’s assessment of those choices, they reflected a society thinking strategically about statehood, legitimacy, and long-term governance.

That historical record matters.

Modern Somaliland operates in a vastly different environment—self-governing but unrecognized, connected to global networks yet constrained diplomatically. Political discourse today is more visible and participatory, but also more fragmented. Short-term controversies often crowd out deeper discussion about institutional reform, economic strategy, and democratic consolidation.

The contrast with 1959 is not a call for nostalgia, nor a dismissal of today’s challenges. Rather, it is a reminder of political capacity. Somaliland’s leaders of the late 1950s worked with limited resources, minimal infrastructure, and under colonial oversight—yet they pursued political organization with seriousness and clarity. They understood that institutions, once built, would outlast individual careers.

For today’s leaders, the lesson is not to replicate the past, but to draw from its discipline. Somaliland’s political tradition did not begin with modern media or recent elections. It is rooted in a history of negotiation, representation, and institutional ambition.

History did not fail Somaliland. It offered a foundation.

What remains is the responsibility of the present generation to engage with it—not as a relic, but as a guide.

Inside the Rise of Yusuf Shaacir and the Growing Threat of Extremist Incitement in Somaliland.

For years, Somaliland has sold itself—credibly—as an island of stability in a volatile region. That reputation now faces a quieter but more insidious test: the rise of ideological inciters who weaponize religion, social media, and institutional proximity to intimidate civil society and normalize extremism. Few figures illustrate this danger more clearly than Yusuf Osman Abdulleh, publicly known as Yusuf Shaacir.

Once associated with cultural programming in Hargeisa, Yusuf’s public trajectory shifted sharply after professional disputes and dismissal from those spaces. What followed was not withdrawal, but escalation. He recast himself as a self-appointed “fighter” for Islam, deploying a rhetoric that frames artists, educators, women’s rights advocates, and civic institutions as enemies of faith.

No evidence has been produced to substantiate his claims of conspiracies or anti-Islamic agendas. Their function appears political: to mobilize anger, delegitimize targets, and silence dissent.

The method matters. Yusuf repeatedly employs takfir—branding opponents as apostates or “anti-Islamic.” In the Horn of Africa, such labels are not abstract insults; they are signals that can place individuals at real risk of violence.

Women’s rights activists have been singled out, with some privately warning they fear attack after being publicly denounced online. This is how intimidation scales—through repetition, amplification, and plausible deniability.

His rhetoric goes further. Yusuf has circulated antisemitic claims about Jewish visitors in Hargeisa, language that security observers say heightened risk assessments and forced emergency departures.

He also attacks secular education, especially where girls are enrolled, misrepresenting science and biology as assaults on religion. Analysts note the ideological overlap with transnational extremist narratives that treat education itself as a threat.

What elevates concern is proximity to institutions. Yusuf has publicly cited advisory roles linked to legislative and education bodies, a claim that—if left unaddressed—provides a legitimacy shield for extremist messaging. Security reviewers warn that this normalization is precisely how radical ideas migrate from the margins to the mainstream.

Investigators are also examining credible leads suggesting external influence and possible alignment with Al-Shabaab propaganda methods, including youth mobilization and social-media recruitment. These remain investigative findings, not judicial conclusions. But the pattern—incitement, target selection, and digital amplification—fits a known playbook.

Somaliland’s strength has always been governance discipline. The test now is whether institutions act early—lawfully and transparently—to enforce constitutional limits on incitement, protect those targeted, and deny extremists the oxygen of legitimacy.

This is not about policing belief. It is about drawing a clear line between faith and fear, criticism and coercion.

Words, when repeated with intent, can become weapons. Somaliland has the tools to prevent that transformation. The question is whether it will use them in time.

Digital Footprint and Evidence

Yusuf utilizes social media platforms to disseminate his hate speech, reaching audiences far beyond Somaliland.

Primary Channels:

Facebook Page: Abw.YuusufShaacir

Facebook Account: Yuusuf Shaacir Personal

Video Evidence of Extremist Speeches (Somali Language):

Speech 1: Declaration of War on Secularism

Speech 2: Incitement Against Civil Society

Speech 3: Attack on Education

Speech 4: Radical Rhetoric

Speech 5: Targeting Individuals

Speech 6: Antisemitic Commentary

Facebook Video: Mobilization Call

A Clear and Present Danger

Yusuf Shaacir represents a critical threat to the peace and tolerance that are the hallmarks of Somaliland society. He is not merely a conservative critic; he is an active agent of radicalization, using the cover of state employment to legitimize a campaign of terror and incitement.

His actions violate Article 10 of the Somaliland Constitution and align with the UN definition of violent extremism. Immediate containment and legal action are required to dismantle the platform of this self-appointed “fighter” before his rhetoric converts into lethal action.

Profiling Yusuf Shaacir: The Anatomy of an Extremist Inciter

Timelines matter in energy. Somaliland just put a date on its future—and the signal is louder than words.

When Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro,” told a room of investors and officials in Hargeisa that oil drilling could begin by 2027—possibly even 2026—he was not offering a casual projection. In frontier energy markets, timelines function as commitments. They broadcast confidence, readiness, and intent. Somaliland, long discussed as a potential hydrocarbon province, is now openly preparing to move from theory to action.

The announcement, made at the Somaliland Mining Expo, marks a quiet but consequential shift. For more than a decade, Somaliland has focused on building petroleum laws, regulatory bodies, and technical capacity while exploration licenses were issued and seismic data gathered.

A public drilling horizon changes the conversation. It positions Somaliland not as a speculative resource holder, but as a jurisdiction preparing to test its subsurface with real capital and real risk.

That credibility rests heavily on partnerships already in place. London-listed Genel Energy remains central to Somaliland’s onshore ambitions, particularly through its interests in key exploration blocks and the long-anticipated Toosan-1 well.

Genel has historically moved cautiously, emphasizing regulatory clarity and risk management. The president’s accelerated timeline suggests those conditions are now converging with political resolve.

Equally important is the external alignment taking shape. President Irro’s recent visit to the United Arab Emirates reinforced a growing economic relationship that already includes the DP World–run Berbera Port.

Discussions with senior Emirati officials on oil and mineral investment signal that Somaliland’s resources are being folded into broader Gulf strategic calculations in the Horn of Africa. For a frontier market, that combination—capital, technical expertise, and geopolitical backing—is rare and consequential.

Critics in Mogadishu continue to assert federal authority over resource licensing, rejecting Somaliland-issued contracts. Yet investors tend to follow control, not rhetoric. Somaliland offers functioning institutions, enforceable petroleum laws, and a level of internal security unmatched in much of the region. In a volatile neighborhood, stability itself becomes a strategic asset.

The economic implications of hitting the 2026–2027 drilling window are profound. Commercial success would diversify an economy still heavily reliant on livestock, unlock new revenue streams, and strengthen Somaliland’s long-standing argument for recognition through demonstrated governance and fiscal capacity.

As the clock moves toward 2027, the drill bit has become a symbol of something larger than oil. It reflects a calculated bet by Somaliland’s leadership that preparation, stability, and timing can turn a frontier into a foothold. The signal is clear: Somaliland believes it is ready—and wants the world to know it.

The 2027 Horizon: Somaliland’s Oil Ambition and the Frontier of Opportunity

President Irro Unveils Historic Minerals Expo to Global Investors

Somaliland & Taiwan to Begin Oil Drilling in Early 2026

INTELLIGENCE DOSSIER: Yusuf Osman Abdulleh (Yusuf Shaacir) – The Anatomy of an Extremist Inciter. 

Subject: Yusuf Osman Abdulleh (aka Yuusuf Shaacir)

Status: High-Risk Extremist Agitator / Potential Terror Link

Location: Hargeisa, Somaliland

Role: Former Advisor to the House of Representatives (Somaliland); Member of Federal Govt. of Somalia Education Committee

Executive Summary: The Self-Appointed “Fighter”

This dossier profiles Yusuf Osman Abdulleh, known publicly as Yusuf Shaacir, a prominent and increasingly dangerous extremist voice operating within the political and social fabric of Somaliland. Born in the nomadic area of Burao (est. 1970) and lacking formal secular education, Yusuf has transformed from a cultural coordinator into a radicalized agitator.

He has self-appointed himself as a “fighter” for Islam, utilizing this persona to wage a dangerous campaign of incitement against civil society, women’s rights activists, and educational institutions.

Crucially, intelligence indicates that Yusuf is not acting alone. Security assessments suggest he has been radicalized and potentially funded by external actors to serve as a propaganda machine, with credible links pointing towards the Al-Shabaab terror network.

1. Radicalization Trajectory: From Culture to Extremism

Yusuf’s path to radicalization appears rooted in economic grievance and professional failure. Formerly affiliated with the Hargeisa Cultural Centre (HCC) as a coordinator for poets, he was dismissed following complaints from the artists he managed.

The Pivot: Post-dismissal, Yusuf pivoted from cultural work to hardline religious agitation. Intelligence sources indicate he was targeted for recruitment by individuals offering financial incentives to weaponize his anger.

The Narrative: He began systematically attacking his former employers, labeling the HCC and the Hargeisa International Book Fair as “secular” conspiracies designed to eradicate Islam from Somaliland. These allegations are unproven but are designed to incite public violence.

Proof of Rhetoric: In his latest speech, Yusuf explicitly declares himself to be “at war” with groups he deems a threat to religion.

2. The Threat Vector: Incitement and Violence

Yusuf’s primary weapon is the weaponization of Takfir (declaring others apostates). By labeling civil society leaders, authors, and human rights defenders as “anti-Islamic” or “atheists,” he is effectively marking them for death in a region where such labels can lead to extrajudicial killing.

Targeting Women: Women’s rights activists are a specific focus of his vitriol. One activist noted, “I am afraid that I might be killed on the streets of Hargeisa… When you are called anti-Islam and apostate, you become an easy target for every fanatic.”

Antisemitism: Yusuf propagates virulent antisemitic views. His Facebook posts against Jewish visitors to Hargeisa framed them as dangerous elements, forcing their evacuation to avoid attack. This rhetoric directly feeds into the narratives of global extremist groups. Evidence of Antisemitic Posts

Education as “Haram”: Mirroring the ideology of Boko Haram, Yusuf attacks schools and universities, particularly those enrolling girls, viewing secular education as forbidden. He publicly appealed for the arrest of an individual posting about human biology, misrepresenting science as an attack on Islam.

3. Institutional Infiltration and Terror Links

The most alarming aspect of Yusuf’s profile is his successful infiltration of state institutions, granting his extremist views a veneer of legitimacy.

Former Advisor to Parliament: Despite his extremist rhetoric, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Abdirizak Khalif Ahmed, appointed Yusuf as an advisor on the Somali language. The Speaker’s failure to distance himself from Yusuf’s fanaticism raises serious security questions.

Former Federal Government Role: Yusuf also sits on a committee for the Ministry of Education of the Federal Government of Somalia, a dangerous position for an individual who opposes secular education.

Al-Shabaab Connection: Security experts and intelligence agencies investigating Yusuf believe there is a strong probability of a connection to Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda affiliate responsible for scores of deaths in the region. His operational pattern—using social media to recruit youth and incite violence—aligns perfectly with the group’s recruitment strategy.

4. Digital Footprint and Evidence

Yusuf utilizes social media platforms to disseminate his hate speech, reaching audiences far beyond Somaliland.

Primary Channels:

Facebook Page: Abw.YuusufShaacir

Facebook Account: Yuusuf Shaacir Personal

Video Evidence of Extremist Speeches (Somali Language):

Speech 1: Declaration of War on Secularism

Speech 2: Incitement Against Civil Society

Speech 3: Attack on Education

Speech 4: Radical Rhetoric

Speech 5: Targeting Individuals

Speech 6: Antisemitic Commentary

Facebook Video: Mobilization Call

Conclusion: A Clear and Present Danger

Yusuf Shaacir represents a critical threat to the peace and tolerance that are the hallmarks of Somaliland society. He is not merely a conservative critic; he is an active agent of radicalization, using the cover of state employment to legitimize a campaign of terror and incitement.

His actions violate Article 10 of the Somaliland Constitution and align with the UN definition of violent extremism. Immediate containment and legal action are required to dismantle the platform of this self-appointed “fighter” before his rhetoric converts into lethal action.