He believed the West would never accept Iran’s regime. Two decades later, he died in a war he once predicted.

Slain Iranian Security Chief Long Argued the West Sought Regime Change — A Warning That Now Echoes in War.

When Ali Larijani sat for an interview in Tehran in 2006, he was already convinced that Iran’s standoff with the West was not truly about uranium enrichment. It was about survival.

“If it was not the nuclear matter, they would have come up with something else,” he said at the time, dismissing Western concerns as pretext. The pressure on Iran, he argued, was reason enough to suspect that regime change — not diplomacy — was the real objective.

Nearly two decades later, Larijani is dead, reportedly killed in a targeted Israeli airstrike. His death marks one of the highest-profile assassinations since the conflict between Iran, Israel and the United States erupted into open war.

At the time of his death, Larijani was again serving as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, the same post he held during fraught nuclear negotiations with Western powers in the mid-2000s.

A former commander in the Revolutionary Guards, he combined ideological loyalty with a calculating pragmatism that sometimes put him at odds with more flamboyant figures inside the Islamic Republic.

He had watched Mahmoud Ahmadinejad win the presidency in 2005 and bristled at what he saw as unnecessary provocations toward Israel and the West. Larijani sought accommodation that would preserve the regime’s security. Ahmadinejad preferred confrontation.

Their rivalry culminated in Larijani’s resignation in 2007 — widely interpreted as evidence that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sided with the president.

Yet Larijani never drifted far from power. He later became speaker of the Majles and remained a fixture within the ruling establishment. As unrest swept Iran in recent years, he was reportedly tasked with suppressing protests — a role critics say he carried out ruthlessly.

He was not a reformer. But neither was he a caricature. Reports suggested he opposed elevating Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, to the supreme leadership, favoring instead a candidate who might temper public anger. Whether that was conviction or calculation is unclear.

What is clearer is that Larijani’s worldview — that the West’s hostility was implacable — shaped his politics. He warned in 2006 that war would send oil prices soaring and could lead to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Those predictions now define the global economic landscape.

His life embodied the paradox of Iran’s ruling elite: pragmatic yet unyielding, suspicious yet strategic. His death may silence one voice in Tehran, but it does not end the conviction he articulated years ago — that for Iran’s revolutionary state, compromise was always temporary, and confrontation inevitable.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has officially confirmed the death of Ali Larijani, the influential head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, following a series of joint US-Israeli airstrikes.

Larijani, a former parliamentary speaker and a pivotal advisor to the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was widely regarded as the most powerful political figure in the country during the current leadership transition.

Reports from the IRGC’s media arm indicate that Larijani was killed alongside his son, Mortaza, and his security deputy, Alireza Bayat.

The operation also resulted in the death of Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani, the commander of the Basij militia, as confirmed by Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz.

The loss of Larijani marks a significant moment in the ongoing conflict, as Western analysts previously identified him as the de facto leader overseeing the selection of a successor to the supreme leadership.

While US and Israeli officials have signaled that regime change remains a primary strategic objective, Iranian officials maintain that the government remains resilient.

They point to the swift appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei to succeed his father as evidence that the administration’s core structure remains intact despite the targeted assassination of its top-tier leadership.

A senior U.S. security official walks away — saying Iran posed no imminent threat. The war debate just moved inside the White House.

Joe Kent Resigns as National Counterterrorism Center Director, Accuses Israel of Driving U.S. Into Conflict.

Joe Kent, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, resigned Tuesday in protest over the administration’s war with Iran, declaring that he could not support a conflict he believes was unnecessary and influenced by Israel.

In a resignation letter posted publicly, Kent wrote that Iran posed “no imminent threat” to the United States and argued that Washington had been drawn into war under pressure from Israeli officials and their American allies.

Kent, a former U.S. Army Special Forces warrant officer, served under Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. His departure marks one of the most senior resignations tied directly to the current conflict.

In his letter, Kent praised Donald Trump for actions taken during his first term, including the killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and operations against ISIS, while avoiding what he described as “endless wars.”

But he accused the administration of abandoning that posture amid what he called a misinformation campaign pushing for confrontation with Tehran.

Kent drew parallels to the run-up to the Iraq war, warning against repeating what he described as strategic misjudgments driven by flawed intelligence narratives.

The White House responded sharply. Speaking at a public event, Trump said he had read Kent’s statement and described him as “weak on security.” The president rejected the assertion that Iran was not a threat, insisting that global consensus recognized Tehran’s danger.

Kent’s political background has been controversial. He twice ran for Congress in Washington state and lost.

His campaigns drew scrutiny over associations with far-right activists and conspiracy-driven rhetoric surrounding the 2020 election and the January 6 Capitol attack. He was confirmed to his counterterrorism role on a narrow, partisan Senate vote.

His resignation underscores widening fractures within the administration and the broader conservative coalition over the Iran war. While some Republicans argue the campaign is necessary to degrade Tehran’s military capacity, others fear it risks becoming another prolonged Middle Eastern entanglement.

Kent’s departure does not change U.S. strategy, but it highlights internal dissent at a sensitive moment. Wars abroad often expose divisions at home. In this case, the disagreement is no longer confined to lawmakers or commentators — it has reached the upper ranks of America’s counterterrorism leadership.

CENTCOM Chief Says Mines, Drone Boats and Torpedo Sites Targeted as Washington Moves to Secure Strait of Hormuz.

It’s no longer just warships. The U.S. is dismantling Iran’s hidden naval weapons — piece by piece.

The U.S. military is broadening its campaign against Iran’s naval capabilities, targeting not only warships but also mines, drone boats and torpedo production sites in a bid to secure the Strait of Hormuz.

Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, said Monday that American forces have destroyed more than 100 Iranian naval vessels and are intensifying efforts to eliminate what he described as Tehran’s “decades-old threat” to maritime commerce.

“We’re also zeroed in on dismantling Iran’s threat to the free flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz,” Cooper said in a video statement.

Over the weekend, U.S. forces struck more than 90 military targets on Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil export hub located roughly 300 miles from the strategic waterway. Among the targets were storage bunkers for naval mines, drone storage facilities and sites producing light- and heavy-weight torpedoes.

While President Donald Trump has said Iranian oil infrastructure at Kharg was spared, he warned that restraint could end if Tehran interferes further with shipping in the strait — a chokepoint through which about one-fifth of global oil supplies pass.

U.S. officials previously said more than 60 Iranian ships and 30 minelayers had been damaged or destroyed since the launch of Operation Epic Fury on Feb. 28. Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed that MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, were used to sink multiple vessels, including a submarine.

The shift reflects Washington’s assessment that Iran is more likely to rely on asymmetric naval tactics — mines, fast attack craft and unmanned vessels — than conventional fleet battles. By targeting these tools, U.S. planners aim to blunt Tehran’s capacity to disrupt tanker traffic and destabilize energy markets.

The conflict has exacted heavy costs. Iranian and Israeli officials report hundreds of casualties on both sides. At least 13 U.S. service members have been killed since operations began, including six airmen who died when a KC-135 refueling aircraft crashed in Iraq last week.

As the war enters its third week, Washington’s strategy appears clear: degrade Iran’s ability to threaten Hormuz before the economic shock spreads further. Whether these strikes are enough to deter Tehran — or provoke broader escalation — remains uncertain.

Senior Adviser Anwar Gargash Says Emirates Could Support Effort to Safeguard Shipping as Iran Crisis Deepens.

The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most dangerous shipping lane — and the UAE may now be ready to act.

The United Arab Emirates could join a U.S.-led international effort to protect shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a senior Emirati official said Tuesday, signaling a potential shift as tensions with Iran continue to rattle global energy markets.

Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, said discussions were ongoing but no formal agreement had been finalized.

“We all have a responsibility to ensure the flow of trade, the flow of energy,” Gargash said during an online event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations.

His remarks come as Iran has effectively blocked or severely disrupted traffic through the narrow waterway, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies transit. The disruption has pushed energy prices sharply higher and intensified pressure on governments dependent on Gulf exports.

President Donald Trump has called on allied nations to deploy naval assets to escort commercial tankers and help restore safe passage. So far, responses from major powers have been cautious, with several governments weighing the risks of becoming more directly involved in the conflict.

The UAE’s position is particularly sensitive. While it hosts U.S. military forces and remains a key American security partner, Emirati officials have repeatedly stressed that they do not seek escalation. At the same time, the country’s economy depends heavily on uninterrupted energy exports and maritime trade.

Gargash suggested that any stabilization effort would need to extend beyond reopening the strait. Once the war between the United States, Israel and Iran ends, he said, a broader framework would be required to prevent Tehran from using its nuclear, missile or drone programs to destabilize the region again.

The statement reflects the Gulf’s strategic dilemma: protect vital economic lifelines without being drawn into a prolonged regional war. For now, the UAE appears open to coordination — but careful not to commit until the shape and scope of the mission become clearer.

Whether a multinational naval coalition materializes may determine not only the security of a narrow stretch of water, but also the trajectory of a conflict that is already reshaping the Middle East’s balance of power.

As Hormuz Disruption Deepens, Arab Gulf Leaders Urge Washington to Finish the Job While Avoiding Direct Entry Into War.

They didn’t ask for this war — but now Gulf leaders fear living with a half-finished one.

The Gulf Arab states did not press Washington to launch its war on Iran. But as missiles strike airports, oil terminals and commercial hubs from Doha to Abu Dhabi, many now fear something worse than escalation: an unfinished campaign.

According to regional sources and diplomats, leaders across the Gulf increasingly believe that if the United States and Israel halt operations before decisively degrading Iran’s military capacity, the region could face a permanent state of vulnerability.

Tehran’s ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz — the artery carrying roughly one-fifth of global oil — has transformed abstract security concerns into immediate economic threats.

Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center described a turning point in sentiment. Gulf governments initially opposed war. But once Iranian missiles and drones struck their territory, the calculus shifted. For some policymakers, the question is no longer whether Iran should be constrained — but whether Washington will see the campaign through.

Yet the Gulf faces a strategic paradox.

While pressing the U.S. not to leave Iran militarily intact, most Gulf states are reluctant to join the fight directly. Collective action might dilute exposure; unilateral intervention would invite retaliation.

The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — have held limited consultations, but no unified military posture has emerged.

The United Arab Emirates has publicly emphasized restraint, stating it does not seek escalation. Saudi Arabia, long Tehran’s principal rival, has signaled red lines — particularly attacks on major oil infrastructure or desalination plants — but appears intent on calibrating any response.

The underlying fear is clear: a weakened but not neutralized Iran could periodically hold the Gulf’s energy lifeline hostage.

The 2019 strike on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais demonstrated how vulnerable even sophisticated defenses can be. Today’s disruptions go further, shaking the region’s carefully cultivated image as a stable hub for trade, tourism and investment.

Washington, for its part, is urging broader support. President Donald Trump has called for international participation in securing Hormuz. But enthusiasm is limited. Many regional leaders worry that deeper alignment with a U.S.-led offensive would magnify the very risks they seek to contain.

Iran’s leverage lies not only in missiles but in geography. Control over maritime chokepoints grants outsized influence over global markets. Even sporadic disruption sends oil prices soaring and rattles economies far beyond the Gulf.

The Gulf’s dilemma is therefore existential and political at once. Neutralizing Iran decisively could restore deterrence — but risks widening war. Leaving Iran partially intact may preserve short-term calm — but at the cost of enduring insecurity.

For now, Gulf capitals appear to be walking a narrow path: urging Washington to degrade Tehran’s capabilities while avoiding a direct plunge into the conflict. Whether that balance can hold may determine not only the outcome of this war, but the strategic architecture of the Gulf for years to come.

Tel Aviv Says Ali Larijani and Basij Commander Killed in Tehran Strikes; Iran Has Not Confirmed.

Another high-level strike — but Tehran is silent. Has Israel eliminated Iran’s top security figure?

Israel says it has assassinated two of Iran’s most senior security figures, marking what could be one of the most consequential escalations of the war to date.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz claimed that Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, was killed in a targeted strike. The Israeli military also said it eliminated Gholamreza Soleimani, commander of the Basij paramilitary force linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Tehran has not confirmed either death.

Iranian state media published a handwritten note attributed to Larijani commemorating sailors killed in a recent U.S. attack, but it was unclear whether the message was intended as proof of life or prepared earlier. Larijani was last seen publicly on Friday attending an al-Quds Day rally in Tehran alongside President Masoud Pezeshkian.

If confirmed, the killing of Larijani would represent the highest-level assassination since U.S.–Israeli strikes at the outset of the war eliminated former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and members of his family.

Larijani has long been a central figure in Iran’s political establishment. He previously served as parliamentary speaker and once led Tehran’s nuclear negotiations with Western powers. As head of the Supreme National Security Council, he occupied a critical role in coordinating national defense and strategic policy.

The Israeli military said Soleimani, the Basij commander, was killed in a “precise intelligence-guided strike” in central Tehran. The Basij militia is a powerful internal security force often deployed to suppress unrest and support Iran’s broader military posture.

Neither death has been independently verified.

The claims come amid intensifying cross-border attacks and rising regional tension. Israel has increasingly targeted senior leadership figures, signaling an expansion beyond infrastructure strikes toward decapitation strategy.

Whether Iran confirms the assassinations — or retaliates in response — could determine the next phase of a conflict that has already reshaped the region’s security landscape.

Despite Heavy U.S.–Israeli Strikes, Tehran Retains Enough Launch Capacity to Sustain a War of Attrition.

Air dominance doesn’t mean silence. Iran’s reduced barrages still carry strategic weight.

The White House has declared sweeping success. “Complete and total aerial dominance,” it said, claiming Iran’s ballistic missile capability is “functionally destroyed.” President Donald Trump added that drone manufacturing capacity has been decimated.

Yet missiles continue to fly.

In recent days, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel have all reported interceptions. A missile strike in Abu Dhabi killed one person. Sirens have echoed across central Israel. Drone-related fires have disrupted areas near Dubai and Fujairah. If Iran’s launch systems are crippled, how is it still firing?

The answer lies in scale, strategy and survivability.

There is little doubt that Iran’s capabilities have been sharply reduced. U.S. officials say missile launches are down roughly 90 percent from the first days of the war, with drone attacks reduced by more than 80 percent. Israeli assessments indicate hundreds of launchers have been destroyed — possibly 290 out of an estimated 410 to 440.

But “functionally destroyed” does not mean eliminated.

Iran entered the war with one of the region’s largest missile inventories, estimated in the thousands. More importantly, it invested heavily over the years in dispersal. Launchers were decentralized. Mobile systems were embedded in civilian or non-traditional locations. Hidden stockpiles were prepared long before the conflict escalated.

Without ground forces inside Iran, fully neutralizing those assets is extraordinarily difficult — even with air superiority.

What has changed is tempo. Instead of mass volleys, Tehran is firing sporadically — one or two missiles, a handful of drones. Militarily, such attacks may be limited. Strategically, they are potent.

Iran appears to be shifting from shock-and-awe retaliation to calibrated attrition. The objective is not overwhelming destruction but sustained pressure. Each launch forces costly intercepts, keeps air defenses on high alert and injects uncertainty into regional markets.

This is classic asymmetric warfare.

Iran’s relatively inexpensive drones, such as loitering munitions derived from the Shahed model, can be produced quickly and launched without sophisticated fixed infrastructure. Even if most are intercepted, the occasional breakthrough is enough to rattle public confidence. As security analysts often note, it takes only one successful strike to shift perceptions.

Tehran’s broader calculation may be economic rather than purely military. The conflict has already pushed oil prices above $100 per barrel. Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains constrained, affecting roughly 20 percent of global energy flows. Insurance premiums are rising. Markets are volatile.

If the war becomes a contest of endurance — missile stockpiles versus interceptor inventories, economic resilience versus disruption — Iran may believe time is not entirely on Washington’s side.

The United States and Israel have degraded Iran’s capacity significantly. But degradation is not elimination. As long as Tehran can sustain a credible threat, even at reduced intensity, it retains leverage.

In modern warfare, silence is rarely absolute. The question is not whether Iran can fire as many missiles as before. It is whether firing fewer, more strategically, achieves its aims.