The rise, financing, and recent battlefield setbacks of ISIS’s Puntland affiliate reveal a weakened but persistent threat.
The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), a jihadist group based in Puntland, emerged in 2015 as a splinter from al-Shabaab. Initially underestimated, it capitalized on clan ties, smuggling routes, and regional instability to carve out a role within the broader Islamic State network. Though often inflated in reputation, the group’s ability to generate revenue and project ideological influence has kept it relevant—until recent months.
Led by Sheikh Abdulqader Muumin, a former al-Shabaab propagandist who once lived in Sweden and the UK, the group established its presence with extortion, assassinations, and media-savvy propaganda. By 2017, its influence had grown enough to be designated as an official province of ISIS, known as the Maktab al-Karrar. While never matching al-Shabaab in strength or territorial control, ISS became a key financial node, particularly after being placed in charge of ISIS operations in Central Africa and Mozambique.
From its base in the mountainous Buur Dexhtaal area, the group reportedly funneled over $2 million annually from extortion, livestock, imports, and diaspora channels. These funds not only sustained operations but also raised Muumin’s profile within the transnational jihadist movement. By 2023, U.S. officials claimed he had been elevated to a broader leadership role within ISIS, although this remains unconfirmed and controversial.
Despite its financial network, the group’s operational capacity has been limited. Its strength peaked between 600 and 1,600 fighters—dwarfed by al-Shabaab’s thousands. Its involvement in international plots, like the planned attacks on the Vatican and Israeli embassy in Stockholm, appear exaggerated or weakly substantiated. Moreover, doubts over Muumin’s legitimacy as a global ISIS leader stem from his clan lineage and the group’s relatively small footprint.
Recent developments, however, have dramatically altered the group’s trajectory. A coordinated offensive by Puntland authorities, supported by U.S. and Emirati airpower, began in January 2025 and resulted in a series of battlefield defeats. By March, ISS had lost key strongholds, including Buur Dexhtaal. Over 70 fighters were reportedly killed, and many foreign jihadists captured. The momentum broke, and morale within the group collapsed.
Yet ISS is not entirely eliminated. Its deep familiarity with Puntland’s rugged terrain allows some remnants to remain hidden. Neither Muumin nor his deputy, Abdirahman Fahiye, have been confirmed dead. ISS could still pose a threat through localized insurgency, relying on extortion from northern businesses and recruitment from marginalized groups, including Oromo refugees and disenfranchised youth in Bosaso.
The Islamic State in Somalia now stands diminished but not destroyed. Its recent losses expose the limits of its reach and the overstated claims of its regional importance. However, the group’s ability to exploit economic desperation and governance gaps means it retains the potential to regenerate. Sustained pressure, financial disruption, and community engagement will be critical to preventing a resurgence in one of Somalia’s most fragile regions.
