Turkey Has Somalia. Israel Recognized Somaliland. The Red Sea Is Becoming a New Strategic Front.
HARGEISA / JERUSALEM / ANKARA — The rivalry between Israel and Turkey is no longer confined to Gaza, Syria or the eastern Mediterranean. A quieter front is emerging across Somalia, Somaliland and the waterways surrounding Bab el-Mandeb.
There is no evidence that Ankara and Jerusalem are preparing for direct confrontation in the Horn of Africa. Yet their regional strategies are beginning to collide.
Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland on December 26, 2025. Turkey rejected the decision, reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity and accused Israel of destabilizing the region.
At the same time, Ankara has expanded its military, maritime and economic presence in Somalia. The result is an increasingly consequential triangle: Israel, Turkey and Somaliland.
Turkey’s Expanding Somalia Footprint
Turkey’s engagement in Somalia now extends far beyond Camp TURKSOM, its military training facility in Mogadishu.
Ankara confirmed the deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft this year. Three Turkish jets participated in Somalia’s April 12 armed-forces anniversary alongside T129 attack helicopters and Cougar transport aircraft.
Turkish naval vessels are also protecting the Çağrı Bey deepwater drilling ship and supporting vessels operating offshore Somalia. Ankara describes the project as its first deep-sea drilling operation outside Turkey.
Meanwhile, SOMTURK—a venture established through an agreement involving Somalia’s Fisheries Ministry and Turkey-linked OYAK—supports foreign fishing-license applications within waters claimed by Somalia.
These activities form a strategic network combining military training, air power, naval protection, hydrocarbons and maritime regulation.
For Somaliland, that network carries political consequences. Turkey is not merely investing in Somalia; it is also one of the strongest international defenders of Mogadishu’s territorial claim over Somaliland.
Las Anod Is the Critical Test
The most sensitive fault line lies in eastern Somaliland.
Somalia has established a more formal federal military presence in Las Anod. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre inaugurated a Somali National Army facility there on August 2, prompting a protest from Somaliland.
More serious allegations require caution. Claims that Turkish commanders are operating in Las Anod, or that Turkish aircraft are delivering forces and weapons for an offensive against Somaliland, have not been independently verified.
The distinction matters.
Turkey’s expanding military presence in Somalia is established. Its aircraft, warships and training operations are documented. But those facts do not prove that Ankara has decided to support military action against Somaliland.
Doolow Deepens the Concern
The disputed September 3 explosion in Doolow nevertheless illustrates how counterterrorism capabilities can become entangled in Somalia’s internal political conflicts.
Jubaland accused Turkey of involvement in a strike on the residence of former Somali security commander Mahad Abdirahman Aden. Five people were reportedly wounded. Turkey has not accepted responsibility, and no publicly available evidence has conclusively identified the aircraft involved.
Somalia’s federal government offered a different account, saying preliminary information suggested that explosives inside the house caused the blast.
The incident remains contested. But it raises a wider question: What happens when military capabilities introduced to fight Al-Shabaab are drawn into disputes between Mogadishu and Somalia’s federal member states?
For Somaliland, the same risk carries even greater consequences.
Somaliland Changes the Regional Equation
The Horn cannot be separated from the broader Israel–Turkey confrontation.
In Syria, Israel has attacked facilities it says Turkey could use for radar, air-defense systems and military deployments. Turkey has rejected Israel’s accusations and condemned Israeli operations as violations of Syrian sovereignty.
Despite their increasingly hostile rhetoric, the two countries maintain mechanisms intended to prevent accidental escalation. Turkey is a NATO member with deep ties to Washington, while Israel remains the United States’ closest regional military partner.
Somaliland introduces another strategic geography into this rivalry.
Its coastline overlooks the Gulf of Aden near Bab el-Mandeb, a maritime corridor made more dangerous by Houthi attacks and wider Red Sea instability. Berbera therefore carries potential value for surveillance, logistics and maritime security.
Israel increasingly views Somaliland as a possible regional partner. Turkey views the same territory as part of Somalia, its principal ally in the Horn.
That does not make conflict inevitable. It does create structural competition.
What the Evidence Shows
Verified: Turkey has deployed military aircraft, naval vessels and personnel in Somalia. It is supporting offshore drilling and fisheries licensing. Israel has recognized Somaliland. Turkey opposes that recognition, while Somalia has established a military facility in Las Anod.
Contested: Jubaland alleges Turkish involvement in the Doolow incident. No conclusive independent evidence has been made public.
Unverified: Claims that Turkish commanders are directing operations from Las Anod or preparing an offensive against Somaliland.
Plausible risk: Turkish-supported Somali military or maritime activity could enter territory or waters claimed by Somaliland, creating an escalation neither Ankara nor Hargeisa initially intended.
The Greater Risk Is Gradual Encirclement
A direct Turkish attack on Somaliland would carry enormous military, diplomatic and political costs. It remains an unlikely scenario.
The more credible danger is a gradual shift in the balance of power.
Mogadishu is gaining stronger military capabilities. Turkish-backed institutions are expanding Somalia’s offshore reach. Federal military infrastructure is moving north, while international actors increasingly operate through Mogadishu in areas claimed by Somaliland.
Each development may appear manageable on its own. Together, they could weaken Hargeisa’s strategic position.
Somaliland therefore needs vigilance, not panic. It should establish direct communication with Ankara, strengthen maritime and airspace monitoring, and document any suspected violations through flight records, vessel tracking, satellite imagery and verifiable command structures.
Diplomatic warnings carry greater weight when supported by evidence.
WARYATV Strategic Assessment
Turkey is not acting as Somaliland’s direct military enemy. But its expanding role in Somalia cannot be treated as politically neutral.
Ankara is combining military power, maritime access, energy exploration and support for Somalia’s territorial claims. Israel, its increasingly bitter regional rival, has moved in the opposite direction by recognizing Somaliland and developing relations with Hargeisa.
The Horn should not yet be described as an Israel–Turkey proxy battlefield. The first contests are more likely to involve recognition, ports, airfields, fishing licenses, offshore energy blocks and competing definitions of sovereignty—not missiles.
Somaliland must therefore distinguish capability from intent while preparing for both.
Turkey faces a choice of its own: the deeper it enters Somalia’s dispute with Somaliland, the harder it will be to portray its role as solely about security and development.
What began as a Somaliland–Somalia dispute is becoming part of a wider contest stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to Bab el-Mandeb.
