After Netanyahu: The Future of Israel’s Strategic Partnership with Somaliland
Gadi Eisenkot has received the mandate to form Israel’s next government following the October election. For Somaliland, the transition raises questions about the continuity of diplomatic recognition, bilateral cooperation and Israel’s regional security priorities.
The central issue is whether a relationship established under Benjamin Netanyahu can become a durable state-to-state partnership.
JERUSALEM / HARGEISA — Israel’s political transition has opened a new chapter in the relationship between Jerusalem and Hargeisa. With President Isaac Herzog selecting opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot to form the next government, Somaliland faces an important diplomatic question: will Israel’s recognition of its independence and the strategic partnership established under Benjamin Netanyahu remain central to Israeli foreign policy after a change of government?
The answer is not yet clear. Eisenkot has received the mandate to form a government, but he has not yet secured a parliamentary majority or taken office. His coalition arrangements, cabinet composition and foreign-policy priorities remain unresolved.
Nevertheless, the transition deserves close attention in Hargeisa. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on December 26, 2025, was a significant diplomatic development. The next phase will depend on whether that decision becomes embedded in durable government institutions rather than remaining closely associated with the political leadership that announced it.
The political transition in Jerusalem
On November 7, President Isaac Herzog announced that he would formally give Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar party, the mandate to form Israel’s next government. The formal handover is scheduled for November 8.
Eisenkot has 28 days to assemble a coalition, with a possible extension of up to 14 days. The process follows an election in which neither of the main political blocs secured the 61 seats required for a majority in the 120-member Knesset.
According to the Associated Press, Netanyahu’s bloc holds 53 seats, while parties opposed to him hold 48. Arab-led parties account for another 19 seats, making coalition negotiations particularly complicated.
Eisenkot therefore faces a difficult political task. His ability to form a government will depend on negotiations among parties with different positions on security, religious policy, military service and cooperation with Arab political representatives.
For Somaliland, the important distinction is that a change in government does not automatically reverse an existing diplomatic recognition decision.
Recognition: From political announcement to institutional commitment
Israel formally recognized the Republic of Somaliland on December 26, 2025, through a mutual declaration signed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.
Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office announced that the recognition would be followed by expanded cooperation in agriculture, health, technology and economic development.
In January 2026, Foreign Minister Sa’ar visited Hargeisa and publicly described the relationship as a long-term partnership based on mutual respect. He also identified water management, medicine, education and defence cooperation as areas for development.
The relationship subsequently acquired a parliamentary dimension. In June 2026, Somaliland’s president visited the Israeli Knesset, where Speaker Amir Ohana welcomed the delegation and described Israel as a friend of Somaliland.
These developments matter because they extend the relationship beyond the original recognition announcement. They create official records, diplomatic contacts and opportunities for cooperation across multiple institutions.
However, they do not establish that every agreement or proposed project has been implemented. The extent of operational cooperation should be verified separately.
Would Eisenkot change Israel’s Somaliland policy?
There is currently insufficient public evidence to conclude that Eisenkot intends to reverse, maintain or substantially modify Israel’s Somaliland policy.
His political mandate is to form a government. His administration’s eventual foreign-policy direction will depend on coalition negotiations, ministerial appointments, security assessments and the priorities of the parties supporting him.
Three areas deserve particular attention.
First, whether the new government maintains Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an established diplomatic position.
Second, whether it continues the process of appointing ambassadors, opening diplomatic missions and expanding bilateral agreements.
Third, whether economic and technical cooperation moves from political commitments into funded, measurable programmes.
The distinction between diplomatic continuity and implementation is important. Recognition can remain in place while the pace, priorities and resources allocated to bilateral cooperation change.
For Hargeisa, the objective should be to establish institutional relationships across Israel’s political system, including the Foreign Ministry, Knesset committees, relevant ministries and professional agencies.
The Red Sea and the security dimension
The relationship also exists within a wider regional security environment.
Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden gives it relevance to maritime trade, shipping security and the protection of infrastructure connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea.
Israel has its own strategic interests in the region, particularly the security of maritime routes, the threat posed by the Houthi movement in Yemen and the wider security implications of Iranian influence.
The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that President Abdirahman Irro met Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, in New York on September 24, 2026. According to the ministry’s account, discussions covered regional security, maritime freedom, economic development, technological innovation, water management and investment.
That statement provides evidence that the bilateral agenda extends beyond the recognition question.
But security cooperation should not be confused with a military-access agreement. No publicly verified evidence cited here establishes that Israel has obtained a military base in Berbera or that a new Israeli government has agreed to deploy forces in Somaliland.
Any future security arrangement would require separate negotiations, legal authority and clear terms.
What Somaliland should prepare for
Somaliland should approach the transition through institutional diplomacy rather than assumptions about individual political leaders.
Its immediate priorities should include:
- Diplomatic continuity: Establish regular communication with Israel’s Foreign Ministry and political representatives across the Knesset.
- Formal agreements: Develop clear bilateral frameworks covering trade, technology, water, agriculture, education and health.
- Economic delivery: Identify projects with budgets, implementation schedules, measurable outcomes and responsible institutions.
- Security governance: Define transparent legal procedures for maritime cooperation, intelligence-sharing and any future security arrangements.
- International engagement: Explain the bilateral relationship to foreign governments, investors and international organizations through documented policies and official channels.
These priorities would help ensure that the relationship is supported by institutions and practical interests, not solely by political goodwill.
The strategic assessment
Eisenkot’s emergence as the prospective head of Israel’s next government creates uncertainty, but it does not establish a reversal in Israeli policy toward Somaliland.
The recognition decision has already been followed by official visits, parliamentary engagement and diplomatic discussions. Those developments provide a foundation for continuity, although the depth of that continuity will depend on decisions made by the incoming government.
For Somaliland, the transition is also a test of diplomatic maturity. The government must demonstrate that its international relationships can survive political changes in partner countries and deliver practical benefits beyond symbolic recognition.
The next phase of Israel–Somaliland relations will be measured not simply by whether recognition remains in place, but by whether both governments can turn diplomatic recognition into durable institutions, economic cooperation and clearly governed strategic partnerships.
