When a state blurs the line between terrorists and authority, it rarely stops at words. Somalia’s pressure campaign against Somaliland shows what comes next.

In the architecture of counterterrorism, language matters. It signals intent, credibility, and alignment. That is why Somalia’s State Minister of Defense, Omar Ali Abdi, set off alarm bells when he publicly declared that “only two groups are allowed to have weapons: the government, which protects its people, and Al-Shabaab, which kills them.” The remark was later withdrawn, but the damage lingered—made worse by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s separate suggestion that Al-Shabaab members could participate in voter registration “however you want.”

Taken together, these statements reveal more than rhetorical missteps. They expose a dangerous ambiguity at the heart of Somalia’s security posture, one that blurs the line between the state and the terrorist group it is meant to defeat. This confusion comes despite more than a decade of extraordinary international support aimed at dismantling Al-Shabaab. By most measurable standards, that effort is failing.

Al-Shabaab has regained key towns, operates within striking distance of Mogadishu, and continues to adapt tactically and organizationally. In March 2025, the group attempted to assassinate the president. Weeks later, a coordinated attack killed twenty Ugandan peacekeepers. At the same time, Somalia’s federal system is fracturing, with Puntland and Jubaland increasingly estranged from Mogadishu and absent from national security coordination.

Against this backdrop, Somaliland stands in sharp contrast. For 34 years, it has maintained internal security, conducted elections, and managed peaceful transfers of power—without recognition and without the scale of international assistance poured into Mogadishu. Western policymakers have noticed. Quiet discussions in Washington, London, and Brussels increasingly frame Somaliland as a case for structured engagement rather than perpetual neglect.

Instead of learning from this stability, Mogadishu has chosen confrontation—shifting from political pressure to economic coercion. The campaign is systematic. Somalia’s failed electronic travel authorization scheme attempted to impose identity control over travelers to Somaliland before collapsing under U.S. and British warnings of a major data breach. Aviation tensions followed, with competing claims over airspace authority creating uncertainty for airlines in an already volatile region.

The most consequential front is maritime. Somalia’s attempt to impose an Electronic Cargo Tracking Number system on all shipments, including those bound for Berbera Port, is not a neutral regulatory move. It is an effort to centralize trade, customs, and revenue flows under Mogadishu, effectively throttling Somaliland’s economic lifelines under the guise of technical compliance.

This economic warfare carries wider risks. Weaponizing ports and shipping regulations in one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors invites instability, piracy, and exploitation by extremist networks. It also entangles regional and global actors—Turkey, Egypt, China, Qatar, and the UAE—each backing different sides for strategic reasons.

The international community faces a choice. Continue underwriting a Somali government that sends mixed signals on terrorism while destabilizing its most functional neighbor—or recalibrate. That recalibration should include a hard review of aid usage, clear counterterrorism benchmarks, and structured engagement with Somaliland grounded in performance, not politics.

A government cannot defeat extremism while normalizing ambiguity. And it cannot build legitimacy by economically besieging stability. The Horn of Africa cannot afford that contradiction. Neither can the world.

From 1959 to Today: Before Hashtags, Somaliland Was Already Governing Itself.

In 1959, Somaliland stood on the edge of political transformation. Long before social media, 24-hour commentary, or digital outrage cycles, Somalilanders were already engaged in the difficult work of self-government—electing representatives, expanding political institutions, and debating the future of sovereignty with deliberation and purpose.

This was not a symbolic exercise. It was formal politics, grounded in law and documented governance. According to official British records, Somaliland’s Legislative Council was expanded in 1959 to include 36 members, 33 of whom were Somali representatives.

Elections were organized across major towns, and constitutional reforms were debated openly as the territory prepared for independence. Somalilanders were not passive subjects of colonial administration; they were active political actors shaping their own future.

“By 1959, the Legislative Council was expanded to 36 members, with 33 Somali representatives.” — Somaliland Protectorate Report, 1958–1959.

These developments culminated in Somaliland’s independence on 26 June 1960—an achievement rooted not in sudden upheaval, but in years of institutional preparation and political engagement. The decisions made in that period, including the choice to unite with Italian-administered Somalia days later, continue to shape political debates today. Whatever one’s assessment of those choices, they reflected a society thinking strategically about statehood, legitimacy, and long-term governance.

That historical record matters.

Modern Somaliland operates in a vastly different environment—self-governing but unrecognized, connected to global networks yet constrained diplomatically. Political discourse today is more visible and participatory, but also more fragmented. Short-term controversies often crowd out deeper discussion about institutional reform, economic strategy, and democratic consolidation.

The contrast with 1959 is not a call for nostalgia, nor a dismissal of today’s challenges. Rather, it is a reminder of political capacity. Somaliland’s leaders of the late 1950s worked with limited resources, minimal infrastructure, and under colonial oversight—yet they pursued political organization with seriousness and clarity. They understood that institutions, once built, would outlast individual careers.

For today’s leaders, the lesson is not to replicate the past, but to draw from its discipline. Somaliland’s political tradition did not begin with modern media or recent elections. It is rooted in a history of negotiation, representation, and institutional ambition.

History did not fail Somaliland. It offered a foundation.

What remains is the responsibility of the present generation to engage with it—not as a relic, but as a guide.

Inside the Rise of Yusuf Shaacir and the Growing Threat of Extremist Incitement in Somaliland.

For years, Somaliland has sold itself—credibly—as an island of stability in a volatile region. That reputation now faces a quieter but more insidious test: the rise of ideological inciters who weaponize religion, social media, and institutional proximity to intimidate civil society and normalize extremism. Few figures illustrate this danger more clearly than Yusuf Osman Abdulleh, publicly known as Yusuf Shaacir.

Once associated with cultural programming in Hargeisa, Yusuf’s public trajectory shifted sharply after professional disputes and dismissal from those spaces. What followed was not withdrawal, but escalation. He recast himself as a self-appointed “fighter” for Islam, deploying a rhetoric that frames artists, educators, women’s rights advocates, and civic institutions as enemies of faith.

No evidence has been produced to substantiate his claims of conspiracies or anti-Islamic agendas. Their function appears political: to mobilize anger, delegitimize targets, and silence dissent.

The method matters. Yusuf repeatedly employs takfir—branding opponents as apostates or “anti-Islamic.” In the Horn of Africa, such labels are not abstract insults; they are signals that can place individuals at real risk of violence.

Women’s rights activists have been singled out, with some privately warning they fear attack after being publicly denounced online. This is how intimidation scales—through repetition, amplification, and plausible deniability.

His rhetoric goes further. Yusuf has circulated antisemitic claims about Jewish visitors in Hargeisa, language that security observers say heightened risk assessments and forced emergency departures.

He also attacks secular education, especially where girls are enrolled, misrepresenting science and biology as assaults on religion. Analysts note the ideological overlap with transnational extremist narratives that treat education itself as a threat.

What elevates concern is proximity to institutions. Yusuf has publicly cited advisory roles linked to legislative and education bodies, a claim that—if left unaddressed—provides a legitimacy shield for extremist messaging. Security reviewers warn that this normalization is precisely how radical ideas migrate from the margins to the mainstream.

Investigators are also examining credible leads suggesting external influence and possible alignment with Al-Shabaab propaganda methods, including youth mobilization and social-media recruitment. These remain investigative findings, not judicial conclusions. But the pattern—incitement, target selection, and digital amplification—fits a known playbook.

Somaliland’s strength has always been governance discipline. The test now is whether institutions act early—lawfully and transparently—to enforce constitutional limits on incitement, protect those targeted, and deny extremists the oxygen of legitimacy.

This is not about policing belief. It is about drawing a clear line between faith and fear, criticism and coercion.

Words, when repeated with intent, can become weapons. Somaliland has the tools to prevent that transformation. The question is whether it will use them in time.

Digital Footprint and Evidence

Yusuf utilizes social media platforms to disseminate his hate speech, reaching audiences far beyond Somaliland.

Primary Channels:

Facebook Page: Abw.YuusufShaacir

Facebook Account: Yuusuf Shaacir Personal

Video Evidence of Extremist Speeches (Somali Language):

Speech 1: Declaration of War on Secularism

Speech 2: Incitement Against Civil Society

Speech 3: Attack on Education

Speech 4: Radical Rhetoric

Speech 5: Targeting Individuals

Speech 6: Antisemitic Commentary

Facebook Video: Mobilization Call

A Clear and Present Danger

Yusuf Shaacir represents a critical threat to the peace and tolerance that are the hallmarks of Somaliland society. He is not merely a conservative critic; he is an active agent of radicalization, using the cover of state employment to legitimize a campaign of terror and incitement.

His actions violate Article 10 of the Somaliland Constitution and align with the UN definition of violent extremism. Immediate containment and legal action are required to dismantle the platform of this self-appointed “fighter” before his rhetoric converts into lethal action.

Profiling Yusuf Shaacir: The Anatomy of an Extremist Inciter

Timelines matter in energy. Somaliland just put a date on its future—and the signal is louder than words.

When Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro,” told a room of investors and officials in Hargeisa that oil drilling could begin by 2027—possibly even 2026—he was not offering a casual projection. In frontier energy markets, timelines function as commitments. They broadcast confidence, readiness, and intent. Somaliland, long discussed as a potential hydrocarbon province, is now openly preparing to move from theory to action.

The announcement, made at the Somaliland Mining Expo, marks a quiet but consequential shift. For more than a decade, Somaliland has focused on building petroleum laws, regulatory bodies, and technical capacity while exploration licenses were issued and seismic data gathered.

A public drilling horizon changes the conversation. It positions Somaliland not as a speculative resource holder, but as a jurisdiction preparing to test its subsurface with real capital and real risk.

That credibility rests heavily on partnerships already in place. London-listed Genel Energy remains central to Somaliland’s onshore ambitions, particularly through its interests in key exploration blocks and the long-anticipated Toosan-1 well.

Genel has historically moved cautiously, emphasizing regulatory clarity and risk management. The president’s accelerated timeline suggests those conditions are now converging with political resolve.

Equally important is the external alignment taking shape. President Irro’s recent visit to the United Arab Emirates reinforced a growing economic relationship that already includes the DP World–run Berbera Port.

Discussions with senior Emirati officials on oil and mineral investment signal that Somaliland’s resources are being folded into broader Gulf strategic calculations in the Horn of Africa. For a frontier market, that combination—capital, technical expertise, and geopolitical backing—is rare and consequential.

Critics in Mogadishu continue to assert federal authority over resource licensing, rejecting Somaliland-issued contracts. Yet investors tend to follow control, not rhetoric. Somaliland offers functioning institutions, enforceable petroleum laws, and a level of internal security unmatched in much of the region. In a volatile neighborhood, stability itself becomes a strategic asset.

The economic implications of hitting the 2026–2027 drilling window are profound. Commercial success would diversify an economy still heavily reliant on livestock, unlock new revenue streams, and strengthen Somaliland’s long-standing argument for recognition through demonstrated governance and fiscal capacity.

As the clock moves toward 2027, the drill bit has become a symbol of something larger than oil. It reflects a calculated bet by Somaliland’s leadership that preparation, stability, and timing can turn a frontier into a foothold. The signal is clear: Somaliland believes it is ready—and wants the world to know it.

The 2027 Horizon: Somaliland’s Oil Ambition and the Frontier of Opportunity

President Irro Unveils Historic Minerals Expo to Global Investors

Somaliland & Taiwan to Begin Oil Drilling in Early 2026

INTELLIGENCE DOSSIER: Yusuf Osman Abdulleh (Yusuf Shaacir) – The Anatomy of an Extremist Inciter. 

Subject: Yusuf Osman Abdulleh (aka Yuusuf Shaacir)

Status: High-Risk Extremist Agitator / Potential Terror Link

Location: Hargeisa, Somaliland

Role: Former Advisor to the House of Representatives (Somaliland); Member of Federal Govt. of Somalia Education Committee

Executive Summary: The Self-Appointed “Fighter”

This dossier profiles Yusuf Osman Abdulleh, known publicly as Yusuf Shaacir, a prominent and increasingly dangerous extremist voice operating within the political and social fabric of Somaliland. Born in the nomadic area of Burao (est. 1970) and lacking formal secular education, Yusuf has transformed from a cultural coordinator into a radicalized agitator.

He has self-appointed himself as a “fighter” for Islam, utilizing this persona to wage a dangerous campaign of incitement against civil society, women’s rights activists, and educational institutions.

Crucially, intelligence indicates that Yusuf is not acting alone. Security assessments suggest he has been radicalized and potentially funded by external actors to serve as a propaganda machine, with credible links pointing towards the Al-Shabaab terror network.

1. Radicalization Trajectory: From Culture to Extremism

Yusuf’s path to radicalization appears rooted in economic grievance and professional failure. Formerly affiliated with the Hargeisa Cultural Centre (HCC) as a coordinator for poets, he was dismissed following complaints from the artists he managed.

The Pivot: Post-dismissal, Yusuf pivoted from cultural work to hardline religious agitation. Intelligence sources indicate he was targeted for recruitment by individuals offering financial incentives to weaponize his anger.

The Narrative: He began systematically attacking his former employers, labeling the HCC and the Hargeisa International Book Fair as “secular” conspiracies designed to eradicate Islam from Somaliland. These allegations are unproven but are designed to incite public violence.

Proof of Rhetoric: In his latest speech, Yusuf explicitly declares himself to be “at war” with groups he deems a threat to religion.

2. The Threat Vector: Incitement and Violence

Yusuf’s primary weapon is the weaponization of Takfir (declaring others apostates). By labeling civil society leaders, authors, and human rights defenders as “anti-Islamic” or “atheists,” he is effectively marking them for death in a region where such labels can lead to extrajudicial killing.

Targeting Women: Women’s rights activists are a specific focus of his vitriol. One activist noted, “I am afraid that I might be killed on the streets of Hargeisa… When you are called anti-Islam and apostate, you become an easy target for every fanatic.”

Antisemitism: Yusuf propagates virulent antisemitic views. His Facebook posts against Jewish visitors to Hargeisa framed them as dangerous elements, forcing their evacuation to avoid attack. This rhetoric directly feeds into the narratives of global extremist groups. Evidence of Antisemitic Posts

Education as “Haram”: Mirroring the ideology of Boko Haram, Yusuf attacks schools and universities, particularly those enrolling girls, viewing secular education as forbidden. He publicly appealed for the arrest of an individual posting about human biology, misrepresenting science as an attack on Islam.

3. Institutional Infiltration and Terror Links

The most alarming aspect of Yusuf’s profile is his successful infiltration of state institutions, granting his extremist views a veneer of legitimacy.

Former Advisor to Parliament: Despite his extremist rhetoric, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Abdirizak Khalif Ahmed, appointed Yusuf as an advisor on the Somali language. The Speaker’s failure to distance himself from Yusuf’s fanaticism raises serious security questions.

Former Federal Government Role: Yusuf also sits on a committee for the Ministry of Education of the Federal Government of Somalia, a dangerous position for an individual who opposes secular education.

Al-Shabaab Connection: Security experts and intelligence agencies investigating Yusuf believe there is a strong probability of a connection to Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda affiliate responsible for scores of deaths in the region. His operational pattern—using social media to recruit youth and incite violence—aligns perfectly with the group’s recruitment strategy.

4. Digital Footprint and Evidence

Yusuf utilizes social media platforms to disseminate his hate speech, reaching audiences far beyond Somaliland.

Primary Channels:

Facebook Page: Abw.YuusufShaacir

Facebook Account: Yuusuf Shaacir Personal

Video Evidence of Extremist Speeches (Somali Language):

Speech 1: Declaration of War on Secularism

Speech 2: Incitement Against Civil Society

Speech 3: Attack on Education

Speech 4: Radical Rhetoric

Speech 5: Targeting Individuals

Speech 6: Antisemitic Commentary

Facebook Video: Mobilization Call

Conclusion: A Clear and Present Danger

Yusuf Shaacir represents a critical threat to the peace and tolerance that are the hallmarks of Somaliland society. He is not merely a conservative critic; he is an active agent of radicalization, using the cover of state employment to legitimize a campaign of terror and incitement.

His actions violate Article 10 of the Somaliland Constitution and align with the UN definition of violent extremism. Immediate containment and legal action are required to dismantle the platform of this self-appointed “fighter” before his rhetoric converts into lethal action.

What Mogadishu says publicly and what regional security dynamics reveal privately are now moving in opposite directions, and the gap between the two is no longer theoretical. It is operational. Somalia’s categorical denials of illicit maritime arms trafficking and external security coordination are not statements of fact. They are instruments of pressure management designed to preserve donor confidence, suppress scrutiny, and delay accountability while the strategic environment deteriorates in real time.

This contradiction became impossible to ignore after an Israeli deputy foreign minister publicly confirmed discreet communication with Mogadishu, a disclosure that directly undermined Somalia’s official narrative of isolation and ideological consistency. When a government denies the existence of a threat while quietly seeking assistance from one of the world’s most advanced maritime intelligence states, it is not diplomacy. It is distress signaling. The denial itself becomes evidence.

The Red Sea threat environment has evolved beyond piracy, beyond terrorism, and beyond ideology. It is now a networked system where weapons flows, militant financing, maritime sabotage, and proxy influence reinforce each other. Analysts who continue to treat these as separate files are misreading the battlefield. The Bab el Mandeb is no longer threatened by singular actors but by convergence. Every unmonitored coastline segment becomes a force multiplier for instability. Every permissive port becomes a logistical accelerant.

Somalia’s southern coastline remains structurally incapable of enforcing maritime control at scale. This is not an accusation. It is an observable condition confirmed by the absence of sustained interdictions, prosecutions, or maritime domain awareness outputs. The insistence that no data exists is not credible in an era where satellite tracking, commercial shipping intelligence, and multinational naval patrols generate constant visibility. In intelligence terms, absolute denial in the presence of ambient data is assessed as narrative containment rather than situational awareness.

This matters because global shipping, energy routes, and supply chains do not respond to statements. They respond to risk. As the threat picture in the Gulf of Aden tightens, Washington’s focus has shifted away from symbolism and toward utility. Ports are no longer evaluated by flags but by governance. Coastlines are no longer judged by recognition status but by control. In this recalibration, Somaliland quietly emerges as the region’s most underleveraged strategic asset.

Unlike its southern neighbor, Somaliland administers a coastline with continuity, enforces port governance with relative transparency, and operates without the fragmentation that undermines enforcement elsewhere. For three decades, this stability was framed as a moral argument. Today, it is a security instrument. In Washington, especially within Senate and defense circles, the conversation is no longer whether Somaliland deserves recognition in principle but whether continued avoidance constitutes a liability in practice.

This shift explains the growing interest in Berbera as more than a commercial port. It is being assessed as a redundancy node for maritime security, a logistics alternative in an increasingly congested and surveilled Djibouti environment, and a platform for partnerships that do not require U.S. forces to substitute for local capacity. Stability that does not demand supervision is rare. That rarity has value.

Meanwhile, Mogadishu’s quiet outreach to Israel confirms another reality. Traditional partners have failed to deliver the intelligence penetration and maritime control required to manage the evolving threat. When ideological posture collapses under operational necessity, governments look for capability, not consensus. Israel offers maritime surveillance, signals intelligence, and interdiction experience that Somalia’s existing partners either cannot provide or will not provide without conditions Mogadishu cannot meet.

This dual reality public denial paired with private outreach is unsustainable. It signals a system under strain. It also accelerates external decision making. In intelligence assessment, prolonged narrative divergence precedes forced correction events. Those events typically arrive in the form of exposed supply chains, interdicted shipments with attribution, or incidents affecting international shipping that trigger rapid diplomatic realignment.

For the United States, the implications are increasingly clear. The Horn of Africa cannot be stabilized through rhetoric or aid alone. It requires reliable local partners capable of enforcing order without collapsing under pressure. Somaliland fits this requirement more cleanly than any other actor along the Gulf of Aden. This does not necessitate immediate recognition. It necessitates institutional engagement that reflects reality rather than legacy policy.

Security cooperation, port governance partnerships, intelligence sharing, and formalized commercial engagement are already easier to justify than they were twelve months ago. Congressional language is shifting. The logic of maritime security is compressing timelines. What once appeared politically sensitive is now operationally rational.

The strategic mistake would be to wait for crisis confirmation. By the time a disruption forces action, leverage narrows and costs rise. The more disciplined approach is to act before convergence becomes collapse. Somaliland’s value is not hypothetical. It is measurable in what does not happen along its coast.

The Horn of Africa is entering a phase where denial is no longer a defensive strategy. It is an accelerant. Those who can enforce order will shape outcomes. Those who cannot will be bypassed. The Red Sea does not reward narratives. It rewards control.

For Washington, the choice is approaching clarity. Engage the actors who already secure the corridor or continue outsourcing stability to governments that deny what everyone else can see. The clock is not loud, but it is running.

Somaliland Launches First-Ever Minerals Expo, Signaling Openness to Global Investment.

HARGEISA — President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) on Tuesday officially inaugurated the Somaliland Minerals Expo 2025, the first event of its kind in the country, marking a significant step in Somaliland’s effort to position itself as a credible destination for international resource investment.

The two-day expo, held at the Maansoor Hotel, was organized by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals in partnership with private companies and stakeholders in the mining and natural resources sector. It brought together government officials, international experts, investors, and industry representatives, both in person and via virtual participation.

The primary objective of the Minerals Expo is to introduce Somaliland’s mineral potential—ranging from industrial minerals to strategic resources—to global investors in a professional, transparent, and data-driven setting.

In his keynote address, President Irro thanked the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, participating companies, and international partners for organizing what he described as a milestone event for the country’s economic future.

He emphasized that Somaliland offers a stable, predictable, and legally grounded investment environment, underscoring that the country has established the necessary laws, policies, and administrative frameworks to support foreign investment across sectors, including mining.

“Somaliland is a country that can be trusted at every level—investment, cooperation, partnership, and international transactions,” the president said. “We are fully prepared to facilitate investors through clear legal systems and transparent procedures.”

President Irro highlighted that the Unity and Action Government’s economic agenda prioritizes the responsible and transparent development of natural resources, with a strong focus on environmental protection and long-term social and economic stability.

“The goal is to ensure that Somaliland’s natural wealth becomes a source of sustainable development and mutual benefit, not conflict or exploitation,” he said.

The expo also featured presentations from international mining experts, including remote contributions via video link, offering technical insights into Somaliland’s geological potential and global best practices in mineral development.

President Irro reiterated that Somaliland’s political stability, democratic governance, internal and border security, and independent judicial system meet international standards—factors he said should give investors confidence in the country’s long-term reliability.

The launch of the Somaliland Minerals Expo signals a strategic shift from exploration to structured engagement with global markets, as Hargeisa seeks to convert its untapped resource wealth into a pillar of national development.

By hosting the fair, the Somaliland government aimed to send a clear message: the country is open for responsible investment and ready to manage its natural resources in a fair, transparent, and mutually beneficial manner.