A worsening diplomatic rift between Algeria and Mali over how to resolve Mali’s long-standing Tuareg rebellion has ignited fresh tensions in the already volatile Sahel region. Algeria, which has historically advocated for a diplomatic solution to the Tuareg insurgency, is increasingly at odds with Mali’s military government, which has taken a hardline, militaristic approach in recent months.

Mali’s ruling junta, which seized power in 2021, has distanced itself from the 2015 Algiers Accords—a peace agreement that Algeria helped broker between Mali’s former government and the Tuareg Coordination of Azawad Movements. The agreement was designed to address Tuareg grievances and prevent the fragmentation of Mali’s north. But the junta, accusing Algeria of meddling by meeting with Tuareg representatives, has effectively abandoned the deal, choosing instead to respond to the rebellion with military force.

Analysts suggest that Algeria’s resistance to this militarized approach is deeply rooted in its own security concerns. According to Assala Khettache of the Royal United Services Institute, Algeria fears that an independent Tuareg state in Mali could inspire separatist aspirations among other marginalized groups across the Sahel. Such a scenario could destabilize Algeria’s southern borders, exposing the country to potential insurgent and extremist threats spilling over from Malia’s attempts to salvage the Algiers Accords have been met with resistance from Mali, which views these efforts as undermining its sovereignty. In December 2023, both nations withdrew their ambassadors, reflecting the deepening chasm between the two neighbors. Algeria’s concerns were further underscored after a deadly ambush in July on Malian forces and Russian mercenaries, believed to be affiliated with the Africa Corps, the group formerly known as Wagner, by Tuareg rebels near the town of Tinzaouaten on the Algerian border. The attack, reportedly the deadliest incident involving Russian mercenaries in Mali, laid bare the region’s fragility and highlighted Algeria’s increasingly complex security concerns as Russian-backed forces gain influence across its southern boundary .

Mali’ on Russian support to counter the Tuareg insurgency, including the presence of mercenaries from the rebranded Wagner Group, has further strained its relationship with Algeria. While Algeria maintains a strong diplomatic and military partnership with Russia, it has expressed opposition to the presence of Russian mercenaries on its border. This opposition is compounded by Russia’s strategic use of the Africa Corps in Mali, where Moscow sees the country as a key to its broader geopolitical ambitions in the Sahel .

In response toating violence, Algeria has called on the United Nations to demand the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries from Mali. However, with Russia unlikely to scale back its presence, the diplomatic gridlock persists. Observers suggest that Moscow’s deepening footprint in Mali may force Algeria to reconsider its stance on military intervention, even as it attempts to balance its significant alliance with Russia against its security concerns.

As the situation in the Sahel continues to deteriorate, Algeria faces the challenge of balancing its ties with Moscow while advocating for a non-military resolution to the Tuareg conflict. Any shift by Algeria toward a militarized response would mark a departure from its longstanding diplomatic approach and could further destabilize a region already reeling from overlapping conflicts.

In response to a deadly attack that killed over 40 government troops in the Lake Chad Basin, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Deby has launched a new military operation, “Haskanite,” aimed at locating and dismantling Boko Haram forces in the region. The attack occurred in Ngouboua, near Chad’s border with Nigeria, and underscored the persistent security challenges posed by Boko Haram, whose activities extend across Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, and Chad.

President Deby, who visited the scene and attended the soldiers’ burials, declared three days of national mourning, mandating that flags be flown at half-mast and directing media outlets to play only religious music. The “Haskanite” operation aims to deploy fresh troops and resources to the Lake Chad area, a region where Boko Haram has found refuge due to its complex geography and expansive, remote islands.

The assault, reportedly involving 300 Boko Haram fighters, resulted in extensive damage to military resources. Heavily armed jihadists overtook the garrison, setting fire to vehicles and buildings before vanishing into the lake’s labyrinthine waters and surrounding areas. Chad’s military command noted that scores of attackers were killed, but some managed to retreat, seizing weapons from the base.

Local conflict expert Saibou Issa emphasized the necessity of a joint regional response to combat Boko Haram’s resilience, citing how poverty and instability push former combatants back into militancy. He explained that while Boko Haram’s presence in Lake Chad has waned due to military pressure, it has splintered into smaller, active factions adept at surviving in the remote lake terrain.

Chad has appealed to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a coalition of forces from Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, for additional support to counter Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. Formed to combat the militant threat, the MNJTF currently consists of 11,000 personnel.

Since 2009, Boko Haram’s insurgency has led to over 40,000 deaths and displaced three million people across the region. This latest incident underscores the region’s complex security dynamics and the enduring challenge of combating militancy in Lake Chad’s vast and challenging landscape.

A 21-year-old man from Maryland, Michael Sam Teekaye Jr., has been arrested and charged with attempting to join ISIS-Somalia, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland announced. Teekaye was apprehended at Baltimore-Washington International Airport as he prepared to board a flight to Somalia via Turkey and Ethiopia, where he intended to join the terrorist group.

According to court documents, Teekaye had been in contact with a Somali ISIS fighter since early 2023 and was actively planning to join the group. His communications with the fighter revealed his intent to travel first to Turkey, then cross into Somalia, where he would fight alongside ISIS militants. If his plan to leave the U.S. failed, he expressed a willingness to carry out attacks on American soil, particularly targeting supporters of Israel.

The FBI began investigating Teekaye after he had been flagged for his extremist online activity and violent behavior since 2019, when, as a teenager, he threatened to decapitate a classmate. His criminal record includes an arrest for appearing at an elementary school with a large knife, wearing a mask, and declaring his intent to settle a conflict.

By October 2024, Teekaye had secured a visa and flight tickets and was ready to leave the U.S. to join ISIS-Somalia. Days before his planned departure, he sent an undercover FBI officer a photo of himself in a black mask, wielding a machete, with a caption proclaiming his extremist intentions. He was arrested without incident at the airport, although he reportedly kicked one of the arresting agents and declared that his jihadist ambitions would continue even if he were imprisoned for 20 years.

Teekaye’s case highlights the ongoing threat posed by ISIS-Somalia, a group that, despite having a relatively small number of fighters, plays a key role in ISIS’s global financial and logistical operations. Based in Puntland’s Golis Mountains, the faction has drawn attention from U.S. counterterrorism forces, with several airstrikes targeting its leadership in recent years. The group has been linked to other cases of U.S.-based individuals seeking to join or support ISIS abroad.

Teekaye faces federal charges of attempting to provide material support to a terrorist organization, which could result in a sentence of up to 20 years in prison. His arrest underscores the persistent threat of domestic radicalization and the challenges law enforcement faces in preventing individuals from joining extremist groups.

Kenyan actress Wanjiku Mburu, widely known for her role as Mama Baha on Machachari, recently received an emotional and unexpected call from her brother, George Mburu, who had been abducted by Al Shabaab militants in Somalia a decade ago. George, a civilian engineer, was kidnapped in January 2014 while working in Mogadishu, reportedly in retaliation for Kenya’s military involvement in Somalia. After 10 years of silence, George was able to reach out to his family in a brief call.

In a tearful TikTok video, Wanjiku recounted the emotional moment when she answered a call from an unknown number originating from Somalia. On the other end was George, who had been missing since 2014. “He said, ‘Shii, it is Kajijo. Have you forgotten me already?’ How could I forget? I think about him every day,” she shared.

George revealed that he had been held captive in a small cell, handcuffed and chained, and that his health had deteriorated significantly over the years. His captors, suspected to be Al-Shabab militants, told him that his abduction was meant as retaliation for Kenya’s military presence in Somalia. They pressured George to urge his family to call for the withdrawal of Kenyan troops from Somalia.

Wanjiku Mburu and her family had made previous attempts to appeal to former President Uhuru Kenyatta but with little success. Now, she is calling on current President William Ruto and the Kenyan public for support in securing George’s release. The Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged the situation and confirmed they are collaborating with Somali authorities to resolve the matter.

Abductions by extremist groups in Somalia have been a persistent challenge, with militants often using hostages as political leverage or for ransom. Wanjiku’s plea highlights the continued danger faced by civilians in conflict zones and the urgent need for intervention to bring her brother home safely.

The UK and the Netherlands are bracing for a potential surge in terrorism linked to escalating tensions in the Middle East. As Israel weighs a retaliatory strike against Iran, following a series of missile attacks, Western intelligence agencies are ringing alarm bells over a likely increase in terror activities on their own soil. This warning, issued by UK’s MI5 chief Ken McCallum, underscores how international conflicts can ripple across borders, amplifying security risks in Europe and elsewhere.

A Multi-Faceted Threat Landscape

The MI5 Director’s annual update highlights a worrying trend: the rise of external threats to the UK, originating from both state actors like Iran and Russia, and non-state extremist groups, including ISIS. While the UK has long dealt with terrorism, the current climate introduces a complex and evolving challenge, where state-sponsored plots are increasing in tandem with threats from radical Islamic terrorism.

According to McCallum, the UK has thwarted 20 Iranian plots in the last two years, reflecting Tehran’s increasing boldness in targeting foreign soil, including through assassination attempts. Iran’s retaliation strategies may extend to UK territory, especially if Israel escalates its conflict with Iranian-backed forces. This presents a serious concern for the UK, given its close ties with Israel and its involvement in global counterterrorism efforts.

The Middle East’s volatile situation, including Israel’s confrontations with Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, creates fertile ground for terror groups and rogue states to exploit. As tensions in the region rise, so does the risk of terror attacks, not just in the Middle East but globally. McCallum’s warnings suggest that the UK could become a target for those seeking to retaliate against the West’s perceived complicity with Israel.

Russia and Iran: State-Sponsored Chaos

McCallum’s speech sheds light on how state actors like Russia and Iran are increasingly using criminal networks to carry out “dirty work,” including sabotage, assassination, and espionage. This new form of hybrid warfare allows these nations to deny direct involvement while destabilizing foreign countries from within. Russia’s tactics, particularly since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, have leaned heavily on sowing chaos in Europe, including the UK. The expulsion of over 750 Russian diplomats—many identified as spies—since the invasion began is a testament to how deeply embedded Russian intelligence operatives have become in Western nations.

Iran’s involvement presents a different but equally significant challenge. Tehran’s use of proxy forces in the Middle East, combined with its increasing reliance on criminal networks for operations in Europe, makes it a formidable player in the UK’s threat landscape. Should Israel retaliate strongly against Iran or its allies, Tehran’s aggression could spill over, expanding its list of targets to include the UK.

Radical Islam and Far-Right Extremism

The MI5 chief’s report points to radical Islamic terrorism as a continuing dominant threat, accounting for 75% of the UK’s counterterrorism cases. Groups like ISIS have been weakened over the years but remain active, particularly in exploiting geopolitical conflicts to recruit and inspire lone-wolf attacks in Western nations. The escalating Israel-Hamas conflict, McCallum warns, could fuel Islamist terror groups’ propaganda and lead to a surge in attacks motivated by events in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the remaining 25% of UK’s counterterrorism efforts focus on the far-right. Although Islamist extremism garners much of the attention, far-right terrorism has been a growing concern. These groups often capitalize on divisive political climates, especially in the wake of terrorist attacks or immigration issues, to incite violence. The rise of far-right terrorism in Europe suggests that, just as radical Islamists are emboldened by international conflict, so too are extremists on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum.

The European Ripple Effect

The UK isn’t the only European nation raising the alarm. Norway has escalated its terrorism threat level to “high,” primarily in response to the Middle East conflict’s potential to inspire attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets. Nearby, Denmark and Sweden are grappling with incidents near Israeli diplomatic missions, further evidence that the repercussions of the Israeli-Iranian conflict are reverberating throughout Europe.

The fear is that, as the Middle East spirals into deeper conflict, it will trigger a wave of retaliatory terror attacks in Europe, with Jewish communities and Israeli interests as primary targets. This creates a sense of urgency for European intelligence agencies, which must now allocate more resources to counter potential attacks while continuing to manage internal security issues.

Ken McCallum’s warnings paint a grim picture of the UK’s security landscape. The intertwining of state-sponsored plots from Iran and Russia, coupled with the ever-present threat of radical Islamic terrorism, sets the stage for a dangerous period of heightened risk. The situation in the Middle East, particularly Israel’s conflict with Iranian-backed forces, has global implications that extend far beyond the region.

For the UK and its European neighbors, the question is no longer if terror threats will increase, but when and how severe they will be. Governments must brace for the worst, even as they work to prevent the ripple effects of conflict from reaching their shores.

U.S. Secretary of State Blinken emphasizes the need for stronger international cooperation to counter ISIS’s potential resurgence amid Middle Eastern conflicts.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has issued a stark warning about the potential for ISIS (Daesh) to exploit the volatile conditions in the Middle East to regain influence. Speaking at the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS ministerial meeting in Washington, D.C., Blinken urged international partners to intensify their efforts in maintaining security, particularly in Iraq and Syria, where ISIS remains a persistent threat.

Blinken stressed the importance of addressing the current instability:

“This is a moment of enormous volatility in the Middle East… it’s more important than ever that we enhance our efforts to strengthen security and stability, including in Iraq and Syria, and prevent extremists like ISIS from exploiting conflict in the region for their own benefit.”

The meeting followed the U.S. announcement that the military mission against ISIS in Iraq will conclude by the end of September 2025. Blinken indicated that discussions would center on transitioning operations in Iraq, ensuring that the Iraqi government takes on increased responsibility for preventing ISIS from reclaiming territory.

“In return, our Iraqi partners will assume greater responsibility for ensuring that Daesh/ISIS cannot protect territory within Iraq’s borders.”

As the U.S. prepares to scale back its direct military involvement in Iraq, Blinken underscored the need for sustaining security partnerships and assisting Baghdad in managing the threat.

While the U.S. plans to reduce its military presence in Iraq, Blinken made clear that counterterrorism operations in Syria would continue “as long as needed.” In Syria, ISIS still controls small pockets of territory, especially in the northeast, where the situation remains complex due to the presence of other militant groups and the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

Blinken also highlighted the importance of addressing the repatriation of foreign fighters and their families, currently held in detention camps in Syria, as a key component of preventing the resurgence of extremism:

“The repatriation of foreign fighters and their families is the only durable solution to the humanitarian and security crisis in northeast Syria.”

The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, formed in 2014, comprises nearly 87 countries and organizations dedicated to eradicating ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Representatives gathered to discuss the next steps in countering the extremist group, with key issues including long-term security partnerships and coordination between coalition members. Türkiye, a crucial partner in the region, was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yilmaz.

As conflicts across the Middle East, including the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, present opportunities for ISIS to rebuild its network, the U.S. and its coalition partners face the challenge of preventing the group from exploiting the chaos for recruitment, fundraising, and territorial gains.

As the coalition shifts its strategy, the question remains whether the Iraqi government can effectively assume the mantle of leadership in the fight against ISIS. Additionally, the ongoing instability in Syria complicates efforts to fully eradicate ISIS, as regional power struggles and the influence of non-state actors contribute to a highly fragmented security landscape.

The Biden administration has been vocal about its intention to prevent a broader resurgence of ISIS, but the upcoming transition in Iraq, combined with volatile conditions across the region, means that the road ahead is uncertain. Maintaining international cooperation and addressing the long-term socio-political drivers of extremism will be critical in ensuring that the efforts to defeat ISIS are sustained.

The ministerial meeting underscored the fragility of security gains in Iraq and Syria and the ongoing need for multilateral efforts to prevent ISIS from taking advantage of regional chaos. With the U.S. scaling back military operations in Iraq by 2025, the focus will shift to building local capacities and ensuring that the Iraqi government can prevent ISIS from resurging. Meanwhile, ongoing counterterrorism efforts in Syria and the repatriation of foreign fighters remain crucial to addressing both the humanitarian and security challenges posed by ISIS.

Islamic State presence in Somalia has doubled over the past year, raising concerns about increased foreign fighter involvement and regional destabilization.

The number of Islamic State (IS) fighters in northern Somalia has approximately doubled in the past year, according to a recent statement by General Michael Langley, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). In an exclusive interview, Langley expressed concern about the group’s rapid growth, particularly in the northern Puntland region, where IS has long operated.

While the exact number of fighters remains undisclosed, previous estimates placed the IS presence at around 200 fighters. With a doubling of forces, this signals a significant escalation of the group’s influence in the region. Brigadier General Abdi Hassan Hussein, a former intelligence and police commander from Puntland, has stated that foreign fighters in the area may now number in the hundreds.

Islamic State in Somalia Doubles in Size: A Growing Threat in the Horn of Africa

ISIS’s Expanding Threat in Somalia: The New Terror Epicenter?

This rise in Islamic State influence comes amid a resurgence of al-Shabab, Somalia’s long-dominant terror group and an affiliate of al-Qaida. Al-Shabab, with an estimated 12,000 to 13,000 fighters, has taken advantage of a diplomatic rift between Somalia and Ethiopia to strengthen recruitment.

General Langley noted that when Ethiopia and Somalia collaborate, they have been highly effective in reducing al-Shabab’s reach. However, the current political friction has weakened that partnership, allowing al-Shabab to maintain strongholds and even regain territory in central Somalia.

Al-Shabab has continued to carry out deadly attacks on civilians, including a suicide bombing in Mogadishu in August, which claimed 32 lives. The group is also responsible for numerous bombings and gun attacks across the country, with recent attacks near the president’s office and in the Middle Shabelle region, raising concerns about the group’s resilience and capacity to strike even in heavily guarded areas.

Despite suffering significant losses in southern Somalia, al-Shabab remains entrenched in other regions, particularly in central Somalia, where government forces have struggled to maintain control after liberation efforts. U.S. officials stress the need for a more robust holding force to secure these areas and prevent al-Shabab’s re-emergence.

The Strategic Challenge in the Gulf of Aden

Somaliland Sounds the Alarm: Rising Al-Shabaab-Houthi Alliance Threatens Regional Stability

Somalia’s security concerns extend beyond its borders, with Iranian-backed Houthi militants in nearby Yemen posing an additional threat. The Houthis have targeted commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden, a crucial global shipping route. If Houthis and al-Shabab were to align, it could further destabilize the region, disrupting commerce and exacerbating the already fragile security situation in the Horn of Africa.

Langley warned that such a scenario could severely impact the global economy by hindering the flow of goods through this critical maritime corridor. Furthermore, the Houthis’ use of advanced missile and drone technologies raises fears that more sophisticated weaponry could enter Somalia’s conflict, further complicating efforts to restore stability.

In the broader context of Somalia’s fight against terrorism, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) will conclude in 2025, after which a new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission will take over. While details of the new mission are still being discussed, the United States has made clear it will continue its advisory role, focusing on training and assisting Somali forces rather than deploying U.S. troops on the ground.

A Complex and Escalating Conflict

Rising Extremism in Africa: A Looming Threat to the U.S. and Its Allies

The doubling of Islamic State forces in Somalia, combined with al-Shabab’s enduring strength and the growing presence of foreign fighters, paints a troubling picture for the Horn of Africa. The instability, compounded by geopolitical tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, threatens to undermine counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Moreover, potential collaboration between al-Shabab and Houthis across the Gulf of Aden could further destabilize this strategically vital area, with far-reaching consequences for global trade and regional security.

The ongoing conflict highlights the delicate balance required to address terrorism, governance, and economic stability in Somalia, and the need for sustained international cooperation to prevent further escalation.

A Region Gripped by Instability

The Sahel, a vast and volatile region south of the Sahara Desert, has been besieged by a surge in extremist violence over recent months, culminating in unprecedented attacks that highlight the growing capabilities of Islamist militant groups. In early September, jihadist militants targeted Bamako, Mali’s capital, for the first time in nearly a decade, raising alarm over the expanding reach of insurgents in the region. Just weeks earlier, over 100 civilians and soldiers were killed in a brutal assault in Burkina Faso, underscoring the relentless violence that has ravaged the region.

For more than a decade, the Sahel has been engulfed in a crisis marked by extremist insurgencies, political instability, and military coups. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—three nations central to the Sahel—are now governed by military juntas, each having seized power under the promise of restoring order and security. Yet, rather than stabilizing the region, the security landscape has deteriorated further.

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), more than 3,000 civilians were killed in the first half of 2023 alone—a 25 percent increase from the previous six months. The violence stems not only from jihadist groups but also from state security forces accused of widespread abuses.

The Extremist Networks Driving the Violence

Two primary groups dominate the extremist landscape in the Sahel: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Sahel. While JNIM has become increasingly embedded in local communities, especially in Mali and Burkina Faso, the Islamic State’s operations are concentrated in the Lake Chad Basin, where it commands less political influence.

Analysts point out that JNIM’s integration with local insurgent factions has granted it broader acceptance among local populations, giving it an advantage over the more fragmented and less politically entrenched Islamic State faction.

“The local populations support [JNIM] more than IS-affiliated groups,” said Shaantanu Shankar, an analyst with the Economist Intelligence Unit. “They have integrated local rebel groups, which have close community ties.”

The insurgents, whether affiliated with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, have inflicted terror on local populations through relentless attacks, kidnappings, and mass killings. These actions, rights groups say, likely constitute war crimes.

The Sahel’s governance crisis has worsened as the military regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have severed ties with their traditional Western allies. Upon taking power, these juntas withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and formed the Alliance of Sahel States in September, aligning their security policies more closely with Russia while distancing themselves from France and the United States.

However, the introduction of Russia’s Wagner Group, a private military company, has done little to fill the security vacuum left by the withdrawal of Western forces. “There is a huge security vacuum after the withdrawal of the French and American military,” Shankar added. “The financial and logistical capacity of the Russian presence is limited.”

Compounding the instability is a deepening economic crisis. Economic discontent, particularly among the region’s youth, has helped fuel the rise of extremist groups. Militants have successfully recruited individuals from marginalized communities, where job opportunities are scarce, and government services are often nonexistent.

“There are very few opportunities for people in rural Sahel, especially the youth,” said Heni Nsabia, an analyst with ACLED. “People whose families and communities were targeted by state forces seek security, status, and vengeance through these groups.”

Financing Extremist Activities: A Diversified Strategy

Despite their links to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Sahel’s militant groups primarily finance their operations through localized means. They impose taxes on local communities, control the region’s lucrative natural resources—particularly gold—and engage in cattle theft. Trafficking, particularly of narcotics, has also become a critical revenue stream, allowing militants to maintain their operations despite international counterterrorism efforts.

The illegal trade in human trafficking, especially across the Sahel’s porous borders, has also proven profitable, with analysts warning that turmoil in Libya and changes in Niger’s migration policies could exacerbate the crisis.

“The business model that these groups developed is very diversified,” Nsabia explained. “This is why it is difficult to destroy them economically. If you target one aspect, they have other sources of revenue.”

Experts warn that the situation in the Sahel is likely to deteriorate further. With the military juntas more focused on consolidating power than addressing the root causes of extremism, insecurity is expected to worsen.

“It’s a very volatile phase, and security is projected to get worse in the next two years,” Shankar observed.

The extremist threat is no longer confined to the Sahel. Militant groups have extended their reach into West Africa’s coastal nations, including Benin and Nigeria, raising concerns that more stable regions could soon face the same violence that has plagued the Sahel.

“It’s undeniable that things are getting worse,” Nsabia said. “We should not just be talking about the Sahel, but also about Benin and Togo, where militants have ventured inland by more than 200 kilometers.”

International Response: Limited but Crucial Support

In response to the escalating threat, the United States and European nations are intensifying efforts to bolster counterterrorism initiatives in West Africa’s coastal nations. Michael Langley, the head of U.S. Africa Command, indicated that Washington was working closely with Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Benin to recalibrate military assistance in the region.

Still, a significant challenge remains: access to accurate information. The military juntas have imposed severe restrictions on journalism, controlling the narrative and determining who is labeled a jihadist. In Mali, the government has branded ethnic Tuaregs—who have long fought for greater autonomy—as jihadis, even though only a portion of them are aligned with extremist groups.

As the Sahel grapples with increasing violence and political fragility, the international community faces the daunting task of supporting fragile governments while combatting the proliferation of extremist groups. With growing instability extending beyond the region’s borders, the consequences of the Sahel crisis may soon be felt across West Africa and beyond. Whether regional and global powers can prevent further destabilization remains uncertain, as extremist groups continue to exploit the vast and vulnerable terrain of the Sahel.