The longstanding dispute over the Nile River has deepened, as Egypt and Sudan rejected the recently ratified Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), raising tensions with upstream countries. The CFA, which officially came into force on October 13, following ratification by six Nile Basin states, has widened the rift over water rights in the region, with Cairo and Khartoum voicing strong opposition.
In a joint statement following a meeting of the Egyptian-Sudanese Permanent Joint Technical Commission for the Nile Waters (PJTC) on October 11-12, the two countries criticized the CFA as a threat to the region’s delicate balance. They underscored the need for a more inclusive framework, calling for the restoration of the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and opposing what they described as the unilateral actions of upstream nations. “The six-state commission based on the incomplete CFA cannot represent the interests of the entire Nile Basin,” the statement declared, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the new Nile River Basin Commission established by the agreement.
The CFA’s ratification by Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda marks a significant shift in regional dynamics. The agreement aims to promote equitable water sharing through the new commission, but Egypt and Sudan view it as a direct challenge to their historical rights over the Nile’s waters, which were enshrined in colonial-era treaties from 1929 and 1959. Those treaties granted Egypt and Sudan the lion’s share of the Nile’s flow, and both countries continue to assert that these agreements remain binding under international law.
Egypt’s resistance to the CFA is tied to its heavy dependence on the Nile, which supplies 98% of the country’s water needs. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, speaking at the recent Cairo Water Week, reiterated that water security is Egypt’s top priority. “We cannot afford to lose a single drop of water,” he emphasized, alluding to the existential threat posed by Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive hydropower project that has raised alarms in both Egypt and Sudan. While Ethiopia regards the dam as crucial for its development, Egypt views it as a threat to its control over a river it has relied on for millennia.
Sudan shares many of Egypt’s concerns, particularly over the potential impact of the GERD on water flow. The two downstream nations argue that the dam and the CFA undermine the principle of consensus among all riparian states, which they see as critical to managing the river’s resources.
For upstream nations like Ethiopia, however, the CFA represents a step toward more equitable development. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has hailed the agreement’s ratification as a milestone in efforts to share the Nile’s resources fairly, stating, “We stand united in our vision for sustainable development, where all Nile Basin countries benefit.” Yet, his words have done little to alleviate concerns in Egypt and Sudan, where the prospect of diminished water control is fueling broader geopolitical tensions.
The ratification of the CFA is not only about water but also about shifting alliances and strategic interests in the region. Egypt, in response to Ethiopia’s rising influence, has been bolstering its ties with other African nations, particularly Somalia. In August, Cairo and Mogadishu signed a military cooperation agreement aimed at countering Ethiopia’s growing regional power. Egypt has also committed to sending peacekeepers as part of the African Union Mission to Support Stabilization in Somalia (AUSSOM), following the conclusion of the ATMIS mission later this year. This agreement came on the heels of a trilateral summit in Asmara, Eritrea, where Egyptian, Somali, and Eritrean leaders pledged closer security cooperation.
Egypt’s increased military presence in Somalia, including arms shipments and peacekeepers, is viewed as part of a broader strategy to check Ethiopia’s influence, especially in light of Ethiopia’s efforts to secure a naval base in Somaliland. Ethiopia has voiced concerns over Egypt’s deepening role in the Horn of Africa, fearing that Cairo’s actions could destabilize the region and threaten Ethiopia’s own strategic interests, including its access to the Red Sea and the GERD project.
As the Nile waters debate escalates, the broader geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa and beyond is becoming increasingly fraught. The division over the CFA not only highlights the enduring complexities of water politics in the region but also the intertwining of security, development, and strategic interests that are shaping alliances and rivalries across East Africa. With no immediate resolution in sight, the dispute over the Nile’s waters is poised to remain a focal point of tension, influencing both regional stability and international diplomatic efforts in the years ahead.
