How Much Would a Credible Somaliland Counter-Drone Programme Cost?
Buying one jammer is not a counter-drone programme. Somaliland would have to fund detection, identification, command systems, trained crews, legal authority and years of maintenance.
The price is a system, not a device
Counter-drone quotations often hide the largest costs. A credible programme needs sensors able to detect small aircraft, software that separates threats from commercial traffic, electronic-warfare equipment, limited hard-kill options, secure communications, training, spares, power and maintenance. It also needs procedures for crowded civilian airspace.
Public procurement data rarely provide a clean unit price because configurations differ. Even U.S. security-assistance records separate non-recurring engineering charges from equipment prices. That makes a precise Somaliland figure impossible without a threat study and vendor competition.
A realistic planning range
WARYATV’s order-of-magnitude estimate is $50 million to $150 million for an initial, multi-site programme protecting a small number of nationally critical facilities, with recurring costs that could reach $10 million to $25 million a year.
This is an analytical range, not a quotation. It assumes a layered counter-uncrewed-aircraft system—not protection against ballistic missiles or advanced cruise missiles, which would push costs into a different category.
A sensible first phase would fund a national threat assessment, a common command platform, mobile detection teams, non-kinetic defeat options, training and one protected-site pilot. Expansion should follow independent testing in Somaliland’s climate and electromagnetic environment. Procurement should be vendor-neutral and require local maintenance training.
WARYATV Assessment
Somaliland can afford a disciplined counter-drone programme only if it refuses the temptation to buy disconnected equipment. The greatest financial danger is not purchasing too little; it is purchasing incompatible systems that become unusable when subscriptions, foreign technicians or spare parts disappear.
Hargeisa should budget for ten-year ownership, publish non-sensitive performance requirements and prohibit single-vendor control of the national command layer. A modest network that works every day is more credible than an impressive battery that cannot be sustained.
Evidence status: Cost figures are WARYATV analytical estimates based on public programme structures; they are not government or manufacturer prices.
Sources: NATO IAMD Policy | U.S. DSCA counter-UAS non-recurring cost notice
