As US-Israeli Strikes Continue, Questions Grow Over Whether Any Regional Force Would Risk a Ground War.
Airstrikes can punish. But who would actually march into Iran?
After the first week of sustained US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran, one conclusion is difficult to avoid: regime change from the sky alone appears unlikely. If Washington were to pursue a decisive outcome, it would face an uncomfortable question — who, exactly, would provide the boots on the ground?
The United States shows no appetite for a large-scale invasion. That leaves the possibility of regional intermediaries. Yet each potential candidate comes with steep risks.
The Kurdish Factor
The Iraqi Kurds are often mentioned first. The Peshmerga, the armed forces of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region, are battle-tested and geographically positioned near Iran’s Kurdish provinces. Kurdish communities span both sides of the border, and unrest in those areas has periodically flared.
But a Kurdish push into Iran would face severe limitations. The Peshmerga is not a unified national army but a collection of factions with limited heavy weaponry. Even if Iranian Kurds offered support, advancing far beyond border regions would be improbable without substantial external backing.
There is also the political hazard. Kurdish forces entering Iran could provoke backlash not only from Tehran but from Baghdad, with whom relations remain delicate. A cross-border campaign could destabilize northern Iraq itself.
Azerbaijan’s Calculus
Another name circulating in regional speculation is Azerbaijan. Northern Iran is home to millions of ethnic Azeris, raising the theoretical prospect of nationalist leverage. Yet direct Azerbaijani involvement would expose Baku’s critical energy infrastructure in the Caspian Sea to retaliation. Oil exports are Azerbaijan’s economic lifeline. A war with Iran would threaten that foundation.
At most, limited border maneuvers aimed at securing strategic corridors seem conceivable — but a full-scale invasion would be a far more dangerous gamble.
Pakistan and the Gulf States
Pakistan shares a border with Iran and has historically managed a complex relationship with Tehran. But Islamabad faces its own internal security pressures and economic fragility. Direct intervention would risk igniting sectarian tensions at home.
Gulf Arab states, meanwhile, have already been targeted by Iranian missiles. Their priority remains de-escalation and protection of energy infrastructure. Joining a ground invasion would upend decades of cautious regional balancing.
The Strait of Hormuz
Much hinges on maritime control. If US and Israeli forces can reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly a fifth of global oil flows — Tehran would lose a powerful lever. A reopened strait would blunt Iran’s economic and strategic leverage, reducing pressure for a land campaign.
The Proxy Dimension
An expanded war could invite outside powers. Russia might provide logistical or technical support; China could extend financial lifelines. Yet neither appears eager for direct confrontation. Beijing, in particular, relies heavily on Gulf energy flows and would risk economic blowback from prolonged disruption.
For now, no regional army appears ready — or able — to carry out a large-scale invasion on Washington’s behalf. The gap between aerial dominance and political transformation remains wide.
Air power can weaken, disrupt, and signal resolve. But absent a willing ground force, the path from bombardment to regime change is far from straightforward.
In that sense, the central question may not be who could invade Iran — but who would dare.
