As Israel’s Targeted Killings Escalate, Hezbollah Faces a Risky Decision That Could Shape Lebanon’s Future
Hezbollah is trapped in a deadly conundrum, a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario, as Israel’s relentless strikes have decimated its leadership since October 7. The most significant of these was the killing of Fouad Shukr, a senior military leader, labeled a terrorist by the US State Department with a $5 million bounty on his head. Shukr was targeted and killed in an Israeli attack on July 30 in Beirut, marking a severe blow to Hezbollah’s command structure and leaving the group with a critical decision: to strike back or not.
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, has promised retaliation, but on his terms and when the opportunity is ripe. Yet the clock is ticking, and the stakes couldn’t be higher. The group’s silence is being mocked on social media, with both Hezbollah and its Iranian backers derided for their lack of action. Unlike Iran, however, Hezbollah’s battle isn’t just with external foes but internal ones too. To maintain its grip on power within Lebanon, Hezbollah cannot afford to appear weak, making a response almost inevitable.
But how does Tehran view this unfolding crisis? Regional diplomacy is in full swing, with Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi crisscrossing the Middle East in search of a de-escalation formula. The latest proposal on the table: Iran forgoes its promised revenge for the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in exchange for a ceasefire in Gaza. This proposal has even garnered support from US President Joe Biden, Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, all of whom called for a truce on August 8, urging an end to the suffering in Gaza.
Yet, a Lebanese news site has indicated that Hezbollah will seek vengeance for Shukr’s killing, irrespective of diplomatic efforts. For Hezbollah, it’s about re-establishing deterrence. Israel’s assassinations, some likely based on years of intelligence gathered by informers, are an existential threat to Hezbollah’s leadership. The group needs to show Israel that these killings come with a hefty price. But can they do this without triggering a devastating response?
If Hezbollah strikes back, the consequences could be dire. War is unpredictable, and Hezbollah has no way of knowing how far Israel will go in its retaliation. Could Lebanon become the next Gaza, flattened by relentless Israeli airstrikes? Even a ceasefire might not shield Hezbollah from further Israeli actions. Israel’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has made it clear that Lebanon is a separate issue from Gaza, suggesting that a truce in one arena won’t necessarily translate to peace in another. Shukr’s assassination has also highlighted a troubling reality for Hezbollah: the group has been infiltrated. The precise location of Shukr was likely leaked by someone close to him, underscoring Hezbollah’s vulnerability.
Technologically, Hezbollah is outmatched by Israel, which has been able to target the group with chilling precision. Despite being lauded as a resistance movement, Hezbollah’s recent losses suggest it is struggling to live up to that image. The group’s primary goal now is to halt the assassinations. But can this be achieved by delivering a painful blow to Israel, or will such a move provoke an even harsher Israeli response?
A heavy Israeli strike on Lebanon would be catastrophic. Hezbollah’s enemies within Lebanon would seize on the devastation to blame the group for dragging the country into a conflict it cannot afford. Even if Hezbollah manages to handle the military aspect of an Israeli strike, the political fallout could be insurmountable. Unlike in 2006, when most Lebanese united against Israel, the country is now deeply divided. Another war could deepen these divisions, making Hezbollah’s position even more precarious.
Moreover, Hezbollah’s support within Lebanon is not as strong as it once was. A study by the Washington Institute found that while a staggering 93 percent of Shiites view Hezbollah positively, only 29 percent of Christians and 34 percent of Sunnis share that sentiment. This lack of broad-based support could lead to internal strife, possibly even civil war, should Hezbollah’s actions provoke a severe Israeli response.
The 2006 war showcased Hezbollah’s strength, but the current conflict is exposing its weaknesses. This is not a message Hezbollah wants to send to either Israel or its internal enemies. The group may be forced to make concessions, such as agreeing to the election of a Lebanese president in exchange for domestic support in its struggle against Israel. But such a move would require trust, something Hezbollah does not have in abundance within Lebanon’s fractious political landscape.
Alternatively, Hezbollah could seek to protect itself by avoiding actions that might drag Lebanon into a wider war. One option mentioned in recent discussions is accepting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s offer of intervention. This would involve sharing influence with Turkey, a deal that might be more palatable than the current arrangement with Russia in Syria, where Israel operates with impunity.
Whichever path Hezbollah chooses, it faces a grim reality. The group will only make concessions when it realizes it has no other choice. Whether Hezbollah has reached that point of recognition remains to be seen.
