Erdogan’s emphasis on Muslim solidarity and anti-colonial rhetoric positions Turkey as a middle power and trusted development partner in Africa amid global rivalries.

Turkey’s growing footprint in Africa is a calculated mix of economic pragmatism, cultural diplomacy, and strategic alliances, reflecting President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s broader foreign policy vision. By emphasizing Muslim solidarity and invoking anti-colonial narratives, Turkey has positioned itself as a credible middle power, appealing to nations wary of Western exploitation and Chinese debt traps.

Turkey’s Africa Policy: A Historical Pivot

Turkey’s engagement with Africa dates back to the late 1990s with the launch of the African Action Plan. This initiative gained momentum under Erdogan’s leadership in 2002, culminating in the “Opening to Africa” policy in 2005.

Trade volume between Turkey and Africa skyrocketed from $1.35 billion in 2003 to $40.7 billion in 2023. Turkish firms have undertaken large-scale development projects, such as ports in Somalia and Guinea and infrastructure in Tanzania and Uganda. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has played a pivotal role, investing $77.8 billion in various African development projects by 2023.

This robust engagement provides an alternative to Western and Chinese development models, which have often been criticized for their exploitative tendencies. Turkey’s approach emphasizes local partnerships, skill-building, and cultural ties, fostering goodwill across the continent.

Defense and Strategic Interests

Africa’s intra- and inter-state conflicts, coupled with its resource wealth, have made it a critical focus for Turkey’s burgeoning defense industry.

Military Bases and Partnerships: Turkey established its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2017. Djibouti has reportedly invited Turkey to establish another base near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital chokepoint for global trade.

Arms and Technology Exports: Turkish defense companies, such as Baykar, have gained significant traction in Africa. Bayraktar drones proved instrumental in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, boosting Ankara’s credibility as a defense partner.

Anti-Terrorism and Security Cooperation: Turkey collaborates with African nations to combat terrorism and piracy, participating in NATO’s Combined Task Force 151 and training local security forces.

Turkey’s narrative of “African Solutions for African Problems” resonates deeply in a continent with lingering anti-colonial sentiments. Erdogan’s rhetoric against Western interference and Chinese debt diplomacy positions Turkey as a reliable and non-exploitative partner.

However, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman aspirations have raised concerns among regional powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who view Ankara’s growing influence as a revival of Ottoman hegemony. Despite this, Turkey’s focus on economic development and local capacity building differentiates it from other global players.

Turkey’s multifaceted approach in Africa—blending economic initiatives, cultural diplomacy, and strategic defense partnerships—underscores its ambitions as a middle power. By leveraging anti-Western and anti-China sentiments, Ankara presents a compelling alternative, reshaping Africa’s geopolitical landscape and securing its foothold in the region’s future.

Often overshadowed by Reagan’s legacy, Carter’s covert support for Afghan insurgents set the stage for the Soviet Union’s eventual withdrawal and a hardline U.S. foreign policy.

President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy legacy often takes a backseat to that of his successor, Ronald Reagan. However, Carter’s decision to provide covert aid to Afghan insurgents before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked a pivotal moment in Cold War history. This move demonstrated Carter’s willingness to confront Soviet aggression while navigating a delicate balance between détente and escalating tensions.

In July 1979, six months before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Carter signed a secret directive authorizing the CIA to provide nonlethal aid to Afghan rebels opposing the Soviet-backed communist regime. This aid included cash, medical supplies, and communication equipment delivered through Pakistan’s intelligence services.

Although modest, the program established critical links between the U.S., Afghan mujahideen, and regional allies like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It reassured these nations of America’s resolve in countering Soviet influence in the region and set the foundation for the larger-scale covert operations that would follow under the Reagan administration.

A controversial aspect of Carter’s policy is the so-called “Afghan trap” thesis, based on comments by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. He later suggested that the U.S. knowingly baited the Soviets into a costly and protracted conflict in Afghanistan, likening it to America’s quagmire in Vietnam.

However, scholars like Conor Tobin challenge this interpretation, arguing that Carter’s administration acted defensively rather than provocatively. Declassified documents suggest the aid program aimed to counter Soviet influence rather than trigger a full-scale invasion.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked a turning point in Carter’s foreign policy. In response, Carter announced the “Carter Doctrine” during his 1980 State of the Union address, declaring that the U.S. would use “any means necessary” to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf.

Carter quickly escalated support for the mujahideen, authorizing lethal aid and military training. This shift not only intensified the Afghan resistance but also demonstrated a harder stance against Soviet aggression, laying the groundwork for the Reagan administration’s expanded support.

Carter’s Afghan policy has often been overshadowed by critiques of his broader foreign policy approach, which was seen as overly idealistic. However, historians like Scott Kaufman argue that Carter’s willingness to confront the Soviet Union through covert operations and the Carter Doctrine reflected a pragmatic and evolving strategy.

While Reagan’s administration dramatically increased funding for the Afghan resistance, Carter’s policies set the stage for the eventual Soviet withdrawal and contributed to the broader Cold War strategy that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union.

President Jimmy Carter’s covert aid to Afghan insurgents redefined his foreign policy legacy, showcasing a nuanced balance of pragmatism and idealism. Though often overlooked, his decisions in Afghanistan marked a decisive moment in U.S.-Soviet relations, influencing the trajectory of the Cold War and reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

How a Somali strongman became the shadowy linchpin of IS operations, fueling its global network and advancing its strategic shift toward Africa.

Abdul Qadir Mumin, the Somalian-born leader of the Islamic State (IS) faction in Puntland, Somalia, has quietly risen to prominence as a critical figure in the group’s operations. Despite lacking the official title of “caliph,” Mumin’s influence extends beyond his immediate territory, positioning him as a potential strongman for IS’s global operations.

Who Is Abdul Qadir Mumin?

Born in Puntland, Mumin spent years in Sweden and the United Kingdom, where he gained notoriety as a radical preacher in London and Leicester. After returning to Somalia in the 2010s, he initially aligned with al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate, before defecting to IS in 2015. His decision marked a significant ideological shift and laid the foundation for IS’s foothold in the Horn of Africa.

Mumin’s leadership is characterized by his ability to attract fighters, fund operations, and coordinate activities across Africa. Despite controlling a relatively small territory, his network extends to Mozambique, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), making him a key financier and strategist for IS-affiliated groups.

Financier of Jihad

Mumin’s role as a financier cannot be overstated. Analysts believe he channels funds to IS affiliates in Congo, Mozambique, and Yemen, sustaining their operations through clandestine networks. His financial influence extends to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the DRC, bolstering their capabilities with weapons, training, and ideological support.

The exact routes and volumes of these transactions remain shrouded in secrecy, but their impact is evident. Mumin’s ability to fund operations has turned the ADF and other groups into formidable regional threats, capable of carrying out sophisticated attacks and disrupting stability across multiple countries.

Strategic Shift Toward Africa

Mumin’s ascension reflects IS’s broader strategic pivot toward Africa. With the collapse of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, Africa has emerged as a critical theater for IS operations. Groups like ISWAP (West Africa Province) and IS-K (Khorasan Province) are expanding their reach, but Mumin’s leadership highlights the increasing centrality of Africa in IS’s global strategy.

This shift is mirrored in the propaganda consumed by IS sympathizers. Analysts estimate that 90% of jihadist content consumed in Europe now originates from Africa, underscoring the continent’s growing significance in the global jihadist narrative.

Challenges to Traditional Leadership Structures

Mumin’s rise challenges traditional IS leadership norms, which prioritize Arab lineage and ties to the Prophet Muhammad. While Mumin’s Somali heritage may disqualify him from official leadership in some ideological circles, his operational success and longevity have solidified his position within the organization.

Despite lacking the title of “caliph,” Mumin wields significant influence, particularly as IS shifts its focus to regions where his expertise and connections offer strategic advantages.

Conclusion

Abdul Qadir Mumin’s emergence as a pivotal figure in IS operations underscores the group’s adaptability and its strategic shift toward Africa. His financial acumen, operational reach, and ability to navigate the complex landscape of African jihadism make him a formidable player in the global terrorism landscape. As IS continues to evolve, Mumin’s role will likely remain central, posing significant challenges for counterterrorism efforts worldwide.

As Trudeau reportedly prepares to step down, the Liberal Party faces critical decisions on leadership and strategy amid Conservative dominance in polls.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is expected to announce his resignation as leader of the Liberal Party, marking a significant political turning point as the country prepares for a crucial election year. Trudeau, who has led the Liberals since 2013, faces dwindling party support and dismal public approval, according to multiple reports, including from The Globe and Mail.

Why Now?

Trudeau’s resignation would come amidst growing unrest within his party, with sources indicating that nearly two-thirds of Liberal MPs have sought his departure. A December 31, 2024, Nanos Research poll underscores the urgency: the opposition Conservatives, led by Pierre Poilievre, hold a commanding 26-point lead with 46.6% support, potentially paving the way for a landslide victory in October’s elections.

Trudeau reportedly aims to announce his decision before a Wednesday Liberal caucus meeting to avoid the perception of being forced out by his MPs. While it remains unclear if he will immediately vacate the prime minister’s office, speculation suggests he may stay on until a new leader is selected.

What’s Next for the Liberal Party?

If Trudeau resigns, the Liberal Party will need to act quickly. The party has two primary options:

Appoint an Interim Leader: A temporary leader would be chosen by the national caucus to guide the party through the immediate transition.

Hold a Leadership Contest: This would involve proroguing Parliament, allowing time for a leadership election.

Trudeau has reportedly discussed the possibility of Finance Minister Dominic LeBlanc stepping in as interim leader. However, LeBlanc’s rumored interest in running for the permanent position complicates his eligibility for the temporary role.

Potential Successors

Chrystia Freeland, the former Deputy Prime Minister, has emerged as a strong contender. Recent polling by the Angus Reid Institute suggests Freeland would pose the greatest challenge to the Conservatives. Other MPs, including Alberta’s George Chahal, have advocated for appointing an interim leader to stabilize the party and prepare for elections.

Trudeau’s resignation comes at a critical juncture. The Liberals face mounting pressure to recover from their significant polling deficit as the October elections loom. At the same time, Trudeau’s departure could invigorate the party with fresh leadership, potentially reshaping its trajectory.

However, with Poilievre’s Conservatives enjoying historic levels of support, the path forward is fraught with challenges. Trudeau’s decision, while aimed at avoiding a caucus revolt, underscores the Liberal Party’s internal struggles and the growing demand for strategic change.

The resignation of Justin Trudeau, a leader who revitalized the Liberal Party a decade ago, marks the end of an era in Canadian politics. As the party navigates this transition, its next steps will determine whether it can mount a credible challenge to the Conservatives in what could be one of the most pivotal elections in recent Canadian history.

Hajj costs for Somali pilgrims rise to $4,604, significantly higher than regional neighbors, sparking debates over transparency and affordability.

The Somali Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs has announced a 2025 Hajj pilgrimage cost of $4,604 per pilgrim, marking a modest increase from last year. While the Ministry attributes the hike to inflation and rising demand for travel and accommodation in Saudi Arabia, the decision has reignited longstanding concerns over affordability and regional disparities.

For many Somali pilgrims, the cost remains prohibitively high compared to neighboring countries. Hajj packages in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti range from $1,600 to $2,500—less than half of what Somalis pay. This disparity has fueled frustration among citizens and prompted criticism from Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, who has accused agencies of inflating prices unnecessarily.

Historical Context and Current Challenges

Somali pilgrims have consistently faced some of the highest Hajj costs in the region. In 2022, prices peaked between $5,500 and $6,000, before a slight reduction in 2024 to $4,434. While the Somali Ministry of Endowments has introduced measures to address service quality and transparency, allegations of mismanagement and favoritism persist.

In 2023, the religious group Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (ASWJ) severed ties with the Ministry, accusing it of bias in awarding contracts for Hajj service providers. Similar controversies have led to public distrust, even as a Somali-Saudi expert committee was established to ensure compliance with health, safety, and logistical standards.

Economic Factors Behind Rising Costs

The Ministry attributes the increased fees to global inflation and higher demand for lodging and transportation during Hajj season. Officials also highlight the inclusion of all essential expenses in the fee, including transportation, accommodations, and logistical arrangements. Yet, these explanations offer little solace to Somali families struggling to save for this religious obligation.

Regional Disparities and Calls for Reform

The stark price gap with neighboring countries has become a focal point of public discontent. While regional governments and private agencies negotiate competitive rates for their citizens, Somalia’s prices remain disproportionately high. Critics argue that inefficiencies, mismanagement, and limited competition among service providers are to blame.

To address these issues, the Hajj committee has promised increased oversight and penalties for companies overcharging pilgrims or failing to meet service standards. Daallo Airlines, which secured the 2024 contract for transporting Somali pilgrims, is among the entities under scrutiny as the Ministry seeks to improve transparency.

The Broader Significance

Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islam, is a sacred obligation for all financially and physically capable Muslims. For Somali pilgrims, fulfilling this duty often requires years of financial sacrifice. The persistent disparities in costs and allegations of mismanagement underscore the need for systemic reforms to ensure affordability and equity.

As the first group of pilgrims prepares to depart for Saudi Arabia in mid-May, the Somali government faces mounting pressure to address these challenges. The experience of Somali pilgrims in 2025 will serve as a litmus test for the Ministry’s ability to implement meaningful change and rebuild public trust.

British MP Gavin Williamson’s recent push for the United Kingdom to recognize Somaliland as an independent nation marks a significant moment in the long-running debate over Somaliland’s status. His appeal underscores growing momentum within international circles for acknowledging Somaliland’s political and democratic achievements, contrasting starkly with the instability of its southern neighbor, Somalia.

Somaliland’s Unique Position

Somaliland declared back its independence in 1991 after the collapse of Somalia’s central government, citing historical, cultural, and legal grounds. The region had previously united with Somalia in 1960 following the end of British and Italian colonial rule, but the union dissolved under the strain of civil war and misgovernance. Since then, Somaliland has established a functioning government, conducted multiple peaceful elections, and demonstrated a commitment to democracy and stability.

While unrecognized internationally, Somaliland operates as a independent state, with its own currency, military, and administrative institutions. These achievements are particularly notable given the broader regional challenges, including terrorism, piracy, and political instability.

Growing Support for Somaliland’s Recognition

Williamson’s remarks reflect a growing recognition of Somaliland’s accomplishments, particularly within Western political institutions. His statement highlights Somaliland’s comparative success in governance, emphasizing its peaceful transitions of power and free elections—qualities absent in much of the Horn of Africa.

In the UK, over 20 members of Parliament have expressed support for Somaliland’s recognition, joined by growing voices in the U.S. Congress. Somaliland’s burgeoning relationship with Taiwan has also garnered international attention, signaling its willingness to forge independent partnerships despite geopolitical pressures from Somalia and its allies.

Challenges to Recognition

Despite these advancements, Somaliland faces significant obstacles in its quest for recognition. The Somali federal government continues to vehemently oppose any move toward Somaliland’s recognition, viewing it as a threat to its territorial integrity. Reports of Somalia spending $600,000 annually on lobbying efforts to dissuade the U.S. government from recognizing Somaliland underscore the intensity of this opposition.

Additionally, the African Union (AU) has been reluctant to endorse Somaliland’s case, fearing it could set a precedent for other separatist movements across the continent. Without AU support, international recognition remains an uphill battle, as many nations defer to regional bodies in matters of sovereignty.

Geopolitical Implications of Recognition

Recognition of Somaliland would have significant geopolitical ramifications. For Western nations like the UK and the U.S., acknowledging Somaliland could bolster their influence in the Horn of Africa, a region of growing strategic importance due to its proximity to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Somaliland’s Berbera Port, managed by Dubai Ports World, is a valuable asset that could strengthen international trade routes and security.

Recognition could also disrupt regional power dynamics. Somalia, backed by allies such as Turkey and Qatar, views Somaliland’s aspirations as a direct challenge. Meanwhile, Ethiopia, a landlocked neighbor, has historically maintained cordial relations with Somaliland, valuing its potential as an alternative trade route. Recognition could solidify Ethiopia-Somaliland ties, creating a new axis of cooperation in the region.

The Role of Western Governments

Williamson’s call for UK action highlights the role Western governments could play in advancing Somaliland’s recognition. The UK, with its historical ties to Somaliland, is uniquely positioned to lead such efforts. Similarly, bipartisan interest in the U.S. Congress signals an opportunity to elevate Somaliland’s status on the global stage.

Conclusion

Williamson’s plea for Somaliland’s recognition represents more than a moral appeal—it is a pragmatic acknowledgment of Somaliland’s resilience and achievements in a tumultuous region. While obstacles remain, the growing international interest in Somaliland’s cause underscores its legitimacy as a viable state. Recognition would not only validate Somaliland’s democratic experiment but also reshape the strategic landscape of the Horn of Africa, presenting opportunities and challenges for regional and global actors alike.

Washington, D.C., is bracing for an extraordinary series of high-profile events in the shadow of a heightened threat environment following the recent terror attack in New Orleans and the bombing in Las Vegas. The convergence of these three National Special Security Events (NSSEs)—the congressional certification of presidential election results, the state funeral for former President Jimmy Carter, and the inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump—presents a unique security challenge, underscoring the nation’s evolving risk landscape.

The New Orleans attack, claimed by an individual allegedly inspired by the Islamic State, and the Las Vegas bombing involving a disgruntled veteran, highlight the complexity of threats facing U.S. security agencies. These incidents, though differing in motive and execution, underscore vulnerabilities to both ideological extremism and domestic discontent. Authorities in Washington are keenly aware that while no credible threats have yet been identified, the symbolic significance of the upcoming events makes them potential targets.

This convergence of high-profile occasions draws lessons from past incidents, notably the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot. Federal and local law enforcement agencies, along with the National Guard, are taking extensive measures to avoid a repeat of the chaos that marred the democratic process four years ago.

The extensive security preparations for the upcoming events highlight a coordinated and multi-agency approach. The U.S. Secret Service, FBI, Metropolitan Police Department, National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Capitol Police are pooling resources, deploying thousands of personnel, and implementing visible and covert measures to secure the city.

The deployment of drones, barriers, and fencing, coupled with the reinforcement of personnel from across the country, underscores the seriousness of the situation. This approach not only seeks to safeguard the events but also aims to instill public confidence in the capital’s ability to manage security challenges effectively.

The legacy of January 6 looms large over these preparations. The U.S. Capitol Police have undergone significant reforms, implementing over 100 recommendations to strengthen their readiness. These measures are designed to ensure that the certification of election results proceeds without interruption, signaling a commitment to safeguarding democratic institutions.

Law enforcement agencies have emphasized their readiness to respond to potential protests and demonstrations, balancing the constitutional right to peaceful assembly with the need to maintain order. The lessons of January 6, combined with proactive measures, aim to prevent any escalation of violence or disruption.

The extraordinary security measures reflect broader concerns about the state of domestic security in the U.S. The recent attacks in New Orleans and Las Vegas demonstrate that threats are not confined to traditional ideological terrorism but also stem from internal divisions and discontent. This dynamic complicates the task of threat assessment, requiring agencies to address a wide spectrum of potential risks.

The evolving threat landscape raises important questions about the balance between security and civil liberties. The use of drones and extensive surveillance, while necessary for ensuring safety, underscores the tension between maintaining public order and respecting individual rights.

The coming weeks will test the capacity of U.S. security agencies to navigate a complex and high-stakes environment. Success will hinge on the ability to coordinate across multiple agencies, anticipate potential threats, and respond decisively to any emerging risks. A peaceful and orderly certification of election results, state funeral, and presidential inauguration would not only reflect the resilience of democratic institutions but also reaffirm public trust in the nation’s ability to confront security challenges.

However, the heightened threat environment serves as a reminder that the United States remains vulnerable to both external and internal pressures. Addressing these challenges will require not only robust security measures but also broader efforts to address the root causes of discontent and division that have contributed to recent acts of violence.

The accusation by Mali’s ruling military junta against Algeria for allegedly supporting Tuareg rebel groups has added a volatile layer to an already precarious situation in the Sahel region. This development underscores the complex dynamics of a region grappling with jihadism, fractured alliances, and deepening distrust among key players.

The Roots of Mali-Algeria Tensions

The accusations reflect long-standing tensions over the Tuareg issue. The Tuareg people, indigenous to the Sahara, have been at the heart of regional unrest for decades. Their repeated rebellions, particularly the 2012 insurgency, have sought autonomy or independence for Azawad, a region spanning northern Mali. While Algeria has historically positioned itself as a mediator in Mali’s internal conflicts, Bamako’s current claims suggest a shift in perceptions, with Algeria now being viewed as a destabilizing actor rather than a neutral arbiter.

Algeria’s alleged support for Tuareg factions may stem from its strategic interests. By maintaining influence over these groups, Algeria could be seeking to manage the spillover effects of instability in Mali and Niger, ensuring its own border security while preserving leverage in regional politics. However, this approach risks alienating Mali’s junta, which views any external engagement with armed groups in its territory as a threat to national sovereignty.

Mali’s Geopolitical Shift and Ecowas Departure

Mali’s recent decision, along with Burkina Faso and Niger, to withdraw from the West African bloc Ecowas further complicates regional coordination. This withdrawal diminishes an already fragile collective effort to combat jihadism and address governance challenges. Mali’s accusations against Algeria may reflect a broader strategy to redefine its alliances, distancing itself from traditional partners and pivoting toward new or non-aligned actors, such as Russia.

The departure from Ecowas also signals Mali’s growing estrangement from regional frameworks that have historically managed crises. This fragmentation weakens the Sahel’s collective security architecture, providing opportunities for jihadist groups to exploit gaps in coordination.

The Tuareg Factor and Regional Implications

The Tuareg rebels, central to this controversy, have long been a wildcard in Sahel politics. Their pursuit of autonomy in Azawad has historically placed them at odds with Malian authorities, but their influence extends across borders, involving Algeria, Niger, and even Libya. Algeria’s alleged support for these groups could be interpreted as an attempt to counterbalance Mali’s growing militarization under its junta and to ensure stability within its own southern regions.

For Mali, the Tuareg issue is inseparable from the broader jihadist threat. The overlap between insurgent groups and jihadist factions creates a highly combustible environment. Accusing Algeria of harboring and aiding these rebels may be a strategic attempt to delegitimize any peace processes that bypass Bamako’s control, while simultaneously rallying nationalistic sentiment domestically.

The deterioration of relations between Mali and Algeria is occurring against a backdrop of increasing regional instability. The Sahel is already a hotspot for jihadist violence, fueled by weak governance, porous borders, and competing foreign interests. As Mali shifts away from cooperation with Western-backed initiatives and leans on non-traditional allies like Russia, its relationship with neighboring Algeria becomes even more strained.

Algeria, for its part, may feel compelled to exert influence over Mali’s Tuareg factions as a counterbalance to the growing presence of external actors like Wagner Group mercenaries in the region. This strategic competition risks escalating tensions and undermining efforts to address the root causes of instability in the Sahel.

A Fragmented Future

The accusations leveled by Mali’s junta against Algeria are symptomatic of a broader trend of fragmentation in the Sahel. As regional actors pursue divergent strategies and prioritize their own security interests, the collective fight against jihadism becomes increasingly untenable. Algeria’s alleged support for Tuareg rebels, whether substantiated or not, adds a layer of mistrust that complicates diplomatic efforts.

Moving forward, the Sahel’s stability will depend on rebuilding trust among regional actors, fostering inclusive dialogue with marginalized groups like the Tuareg, and addressing the socio-economic drivers of conflict. Without a unified approach, the region risks sliding further into chaos, with implications not just for Mali and Algeria but for the entire international community invested in countering terrorism and fostering stability in the Sahel.