The Islamic State’s affiliate in Somalia, though smaller than its Middle Eastern counterparts, is rapidly gaining strength due to an influx of foreign fighters. A recent report by the United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Team for Somalia reveals that fighters from at least six countries have doubled the group’s numbers and significantly enhanced its operational capabilities.

The affiliate, known as IS-Somalia, has grown from an estimated 300 fighters to between 600 and 700, according to intelligence shared by U.N. member states. These recruits have not only fortified IS’s position in Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region but also helped it seize territory from al-Shabab, its main rival.

Foreign Fighters

FBI arrests Maryland Man for Plot to Join ISIS-Somalia

The report highlights the arrival of foreign militants via maritime and overland routes into Puntland. Fighters from Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia, Sudan, Morocco, and Tanzania are among those bolstering IS ranks.

Captured foreign fighters have disclosed working with trainers from the Middle East, indicating IS’s continued ability to mobilize international networks despite territorial losses in Iraq and Syria.

This foreign support has transformed IS-Somalia’s operational landscape, particularly in Puntland’s Cal Miskaad mountains. Intelligence sources describe the territorial gains as a “drastic change,” driven largely by the newcomers’ expertise and resources.

 IS-Somalia’s Expansion

Puntland Forces Uncover Major Weapons Cache, Arrest Al-Shabaab and ISIS Suspects in Bosaso

IS-Somalia’s growing prominence is not limited to its local activities. Since 2022, Somalia has hosted al-Karrar, one of nine regional offices established by the Islamic State to coordinate global operations.

The U.N. report underscores al-Karrar’s resilience despite leadership losses, noting its decentralization has made it harder to disrupt. Former IS-Somalia leader Abdulqadir Mumin, who narrowly survived a U.S. airstrike in June, now heads the Islamic State’s general directorate of provinces. This role gives him authority over IS affiliates across Africa, highlighting Somalia’s elevated status within the group’s global hierarchy.

IS-Somalia Leadership and Financial Strength

IS-Somalia’s Resurgence Threatens Stability in Northern Somalia

IS-Somalia’s current leadership includes Abdirahman Fahiye Isse as its new head, with Abdiwali Waran-Walac managing finances.

Despite its relatively small size, the group’s financial stability is noteworthy. The U.N. report indicates that IS-Somalia is self-sufficient and even generates additional revenue to support other IS affiliates. The al-Karrar office plays a crucial role in coordinating these financial operations.

Rising Threats and Regional Concerns

AFRICOM Chief Reports Surge in Islamic State Fighters in Northern Somalia

The surge in foreign fighters has sparked alarm among counterterrorism experts.

This influx of foreign terrorist fighters in Africa is concerning, said Austin Doctor, director of counterterrorism research at the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center.

While the number of fighters in Somalia is far smaller than those who joined IS during its peak in Syria and Iraq, the trend is troubling. Factors such as weak governance and porous borders make the Horn of Africa an attractive destination for militants seeking to join extremist organizations.

Preparedness and Countermeasures

U.S. and Daesh: Uncovering a New Battlefront in Somalia

Experts warn that IS-Somalia’s growth signals a broader shift in jihadist activity toward Africa, necessitating heightened vigilance from both regional and global security forces.

Global and local security forces should prepare to see more of this in the near term, Doctor cautioned.

The group’s ascent, combined with its links to IS’s global apparatus, poses an escalating challenge to Somalia’s stability and international counterterrorism efforts.

As IS-Somalia continues to expand its reach and influence, its rise underscores the enduring threat posed by the Islamic State, even as it transitions to new theaters of operation.

Islamic State’s Somalia Branch Gains Ground: A Threat That Can’t Be Ignored

ISIS’s Expanding Threat in Somalia: The New Terror Epicenter?

The emergence of Lakurawa as a potent threat in Nigeria’s northwest is less a product of recent geopolitical shifts and more a reflection of longstanding systemic failures. Despite Nigerian military claims that the group represents a “new” terror threat linked to the turmoil following Sahelian coups, analysts and researchers assert that Lakurawa’s roots extend back over two decades.

A History of Violence and Opportunism

Lakurawa, predominantly composed of armed herders speaking Fulfulde and Arabic, has operated along the Nigeria-Niger border since 1999. Originally invited by local traditional leaders to protect communities from banditry, the group later turned on its patrons. By 2017, it had begun imposing its version of Islamic governance, levying taxes, and engaging in violence, including the killing of the district head of Balle, who once supported them.

The group’s affiliations with jihadist networks in the Sahel further complicate the security landscape. Their activities align with broader patterns of terrorism in the region, characterized by porous borders and ungoverned spaces exploited by militant factions.

Structural Failures and Missed Opportunities

The rise of Lakurawa underscores Nigeria’s chronic security lapses, particularly in border management and the provision of basic governance. Analysts argue that the failure to create state-level police forces and empower local communities has left rural areas vulnerable to predatory groups.

The Nigerian government’s reactive military campaigns, such as the recent Operation Fansan Yamma following Lakurawa’s deadly attack in Kebbi State, highlight the limitations of force-centric strategies. Without addressing root causes like poverty, weak governance, and inter-ethnic tensions, such measures are unlikely to achieve lasting peace.

A Path Forward: Collaboration and Decentralization

Experts emphasize that sustainable security solutions require a multi-faceted approach. Key recommendations include:

Decentralized Policing: Devolving police powers to Nigeria’s federating units could enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of law enforcement in vulnerable regions.

Intelligence-Driven Operations: Preventive measures, including robust intelligence networks, must replace reactive strategies.

Regional Cooperation: Enhanced cross-border collaboration with neighboring states is crucial to countering the mobility of terror groups like Lakurawa.

Empowering Local Communities: Supporting grassroots initiatives can help address the socio-economic conditions that foster insecurity.

Conclusion

The Lakurawa phenomenon reflects a deeper crisis of governance and security in Nigeria. As the nation grapples with growing insurgency risks, addressing systemic failures will be critical to preventing further escalation and stabilizing its borders.

Ethiopia has vowed to sustain its efforts against the al-Shabaab militant group, reaffirming its commitment to regional security despite Somalia’s recent decision to exclude Ethiopia from the forthcoming African Union Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

Ambassador Nebiat Getachew, the spokesperson for Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared on November 14, 2024, that Ethiopia’s mission to combat al-Shabaab “will continue in any way possible” to ensure that the militant group does not pose a threat to Ethiopia or the broader region. He emphasized the importance of consolidating past successes to prevent any resurgence of al-Shabaab.

The announcement underscores Ethiopia’s stance as a regional security leader, particularly in counterterrorism operations. According to Ambassador Nebiat, Ethiopia sees its strategic role as intertwined with Somalia’s stability, despite growing tensions. “Ethiopia and Somalia are inseparable neighbors,” he stated, stressing that Ethiopia’s actions aim to bolster long-term regional integration.

This resolve comes amid a diplomatic dispute following Somalia’s declaration that Ethiopia would not take part in AUSSOM. The decision was attributed to Ethiopia’s controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, signed earlier this year. Somalia’s Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur argued that the agreement undermines Somalia’s sovereignty, as Somaliland is internationally recognized as a part of Somalia despite its claims of independence.

AUSSOM, set to launch in January 2025, will replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which concludes its mandate at the end of this year. With an initial deployment of approximately 12,000 troops, AUSSOM is tasked with continuing the AU’s support to Somalia in its fight against al-Shabaab, which has been a persistent destabilizing force since 2007.

Ethiopia’s involvement in AU-led missions, including AMISOM and ATMIS, has been instrumental in diminishing al-Shabaab’s stronghold in Somalia. However, Somalia’s rejection of Ethiopian participation in AUSSOM signals a growing rift, particularly in light of Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.

Ethiopia has defended the agreement, portraying it as an economic partnership that aligns with its broader regional integration goals. However, Somalia’s exclusion of Ethiopia from AUSSOM indicates deepening mistrust between the two nations.

As Ethiopia continues its operations against al-Shabaab independently, the diplomatic fallout with Somalia could complicate regional security dynamics. Ethiopia’s emphasis on regional stability and integration suggests it will maintain its military posture against al-Shabaab while navigating the delicate balance of its relationships with Somalia and Somaliland.

For Somalia, the challenge lies in consolidating its sovereignty while ensuring effective regional cooperation against the shared threat of al-Shabaab. With AUSSOM set to begin in January, the role of neighboring states and the African Union will be critical in shaping the future of the region’s fight against extremism.

Nigerian security analysts are expressing heightened concern after defense officials announced the emergence of a new insurgent group, the Lakurawas, now operating primarily in Nigeria’s northwestern region. The group reportedly originates from the Sahel, with members from Mali and Niger. According to defense sources, the insurgents entered Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states following last year’s coup in Niger, which strained security cooperation and disrupted joint military patrols along the Nigerian border.

Major General Edward Buba, spokesperson for Nigeria’s defense department, disclosed to journalists in Abuja that authorities are monitoring the group’s activities closely, though he did not confirm any major attacks attributed to them. Local reports, however, indicate that the group has been demanding livestock from local residents in exchange for “protection”—a method commonly employed by extremist groups to finance their operations and exert influence over communities.

“This is the first attempt of the Sahelian jihadists to establish a presence in our country,” Buba said, acknowledging the weakened security ties following the Niger coup. “We know exactly where they are, and we’re taking measures.”

The Lakurawas’ presence in northwestern Nigeria introduces yet another security challenge to an area already destabilized by the activities of Boko Haram, armed gangs, and frequent kidnappings. In recent months, Nigeria’s military has intensified its efforts against existing insurgents, reporting the deaths of over 160 militants, the arrest of 80 others, and the rescue of numerous captives.

Security analyst Senator Iroegbu shared concerns that the group’s establishment could strain Nigeria’s already limited security resources. “We saw this coming when the Niger coup happened,” Iroegbu remarked, pointing to the breakdown of regional cooperation under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). He emphasized that, despite diplomatic tensions, maintaining security and intelligence cooperation is essential.

Since the onset of the Niger crisis, Nigeria’s government has aimed to restore ties. In August, Nigeria’s chief of defense staff made an official visit to Niger to reinforce military collaboration.

The arrival of the Lakurawas underscores the broader security challenges Nigeria faces in its northern regions, where local governance is undercut by various insurgent factions. General Buba assured that security forces remain committed to countering the threat, pledging vigilance and active measures to protect citizens. Nevertheless, the appearance of this group calls for an urgent re-evaluation of Nigeria’s regional partnerships to secure its borders against the influence of Sahel-based jihadist movements.

As regional tensions continue, Nigeria may need to bolster its security framework and strengthen intelligence-sharing agreements to confront this evolving threat effectively.

A worsening diplomatic rift between Algeria and Mali over how to resolve Mali’s long-standing Tuareg rebellion has ignited fresh tensions in the already volatile Sahel region. Algeria, which has historically advocated for a diplomatic solution to the Tuareg insurgency, is increasingly at odds with Mali’s military government, which has taken a hardline, militaristic approach in recent months.

Mali’s ruling junta, which seized power in 2021, has distanced itself from the 2015 Algiers Accords—a peace agreement that Algeria helped broker between Mali’s former government and the Tuareg Coordination of Azawad Movements. The agreement was designed to address Tuareg grievances and prevent the fragmentation of Mali’s north. But the junta, accusing Algeria of meddling by meeting with Tuareg representatives, has effectively abandoned the deal, choosing instead to respond to the rebellion with military force.

Analysts suggest that Algeria’s resistance to this militarized approach is deeply rooted in its own security concerns. According to Assala Khettache of the Royal United Services Institute, Algeria fears that an independent Tuareg state in Mali could inspire separatist aspirations among other marginalized groups across the Sahel. Such a scenario could destabilize Algeria’s southern borders, exposing the country to potential insurgent and extremist threats spilling over from Malia’s attempts to salvage the Algiers Accords have been met with resistance from Mali, which views these efforts as undermining its sovereignty. In December 2023, both nations withdrew their ambassadors, reflecting the deepening chasm between the two neighbors. Algeria’s concerns were further underscored after a deadly ambush in July on Malian forces and Russian mercenaries, believed to be affiliated with the Africa Corps, the group formerly known as Wagner, by Tuareg rebels near the town of Tinzaouaten on the Algerian border. The attack, reportedly the deadliest incident involving Russian mercenaries in Mali, laid bare the region’s fragility and highlighted Algeria’s increasingly complex security concerns as Russian-backed forces gain influence across its southern boundary .

Mali’ on Russian support to counter the Tuareg insurgency, including the presence of mercenaries from the rebranded Wagner Group, has further strained its relationship with Algeria. While Algeria maintains a strong diplomatic and military partnership with Russia, it has expressed opposition to the presence of Russian mercenaries on its border. This opposition is compounded by Russia’s strategic use of the Africa Corps in Mali, where Moscow sees the country as a key to its broader geopolitical ambitions in the Sahel .

In response toating violence, Algeria has called on the United Nations to demand the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries from Mali. However, with Russia unlikely to scale back its presence, the diplomatic gridlock persists. Observers suggest that Moscow’s deepening footprint in Mali may force Algeria to reconsider its stance on military intervention, even as it attempts to balance its significant alliance with Russia against its security concerns.

As the situation in the Sahel continues to deteriorate, Algeria faces the challenge of balancing its ties with Moscow while advocating for a non-military resolution to the Tuareg conflict. Any shift by Algeria toward a militarized response would mark a departure from its longstanding diplomatic approach and could further destabilize a region already reeling from overlapping conflicts.

In response to a deadly attack that killed over 40 government troops in the Lake Chad Basin, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Deby has launched a new military operation, “Haskanite,” aimed at locating and dismantling Boko Haram forces in the region. The attack occurred in Ngouboua, near Chad’s border with Nigeria, and underscored the persistent security challenges posed by Boko Haram, whose activities extend across Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, and Chad.

President Deby, who visited the scene and attended the soldiers’ burials, declared three days of national mourning, mandating that flags be flown at half-mast and directing media outlets to play only religious music. The “Haskanite” operation aims to deploy fresh troops and resources to the Lake Chad area, a region where Boko Haram has found refuge due to its complex geography and expansive, remote islands.

The assault, reportedly involving 300 Boko Haram fighters, resulted in extensive damage to military resources. Heavily armed jihadists overtook the garrison, setting fire to vehicles and buildings before vanishing into the lake’s labyrinthine waters and surrounding areas. Chad’s military command noted that scores of attackers were killed, but some managed to retreat, seizing weapons from the base.

Local conflict expert Saibou Issa emphasized the necessity of a joint regional response to combat Boko Haram’s resilience, citing how poverty and instability push former combatants back into militancy. He explained that while Boko Haram’s presence in Lake Chad has waned due to military pressure, it has splintered into smaller, active factions adept at surviving in the remote lake terrain.

Chad has appealed to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a coalition of forces from Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, for additional support to counter Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. Formed to combat the militant threat, the MNJTF currently consists of 11,000 personnel.

Since 2009, Boko Haram’s insurgency has led to over 40,000 deaths and displaced three million people across the region. This latest incident underscores the region’s complex security dynamics and the enduring challenge of combating militancy in Lake Chad’s vast and challenging landscape.

A 21-year-old man from Maryland, Michael Sam Teekaye Jr., has been arrested and charged with attempting to join ISIS-Somalia, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland announced. Teekaye was apprehended at Baltimore-Washington International Airport as he prepared to board a flight to Somalia via Turkey and Ethiopia, where he intended to join the terrorist group.

According to court documents, Teekaye had been in contact with a Somali ISIS fighter since early 2023 and was actively planning to join the group. His communications with the fighter revealed his intent to travel first to Turkey, then cross into Somalia, where he would fight alongside ISIS militants. If his plan to leave the U.S. failed, he expressed a willingness to carry out attacks on American soil, particularly targeting supporters of Israel.

The FBI began investigating Teekaye after he had been flagged for his extremist online activity and violent behavior since 2019, when, as a teenager, he threatened to decapitate a classmate. His criminal record includes an arrest for appearing at an elementary school with a large knife, wearing a mask, and declaring his intent to settle a conflict.

By October 2024, Teekaye had secured a visa and flight tickets and was ready to leave the U.S. to join ISIS-Somalia. Days before his planned departure, he sent an undercover FBI officer a photo of himself in a black mask, wielding a machete, with a caption proclaiming his extremist intentions. He was arrested without incident at the airport, although he reportedly kicked one of the arresting agents and declared that his jihadist ambitions would continue even if he were imprisoned for 20 years.

Teekaye’s case highlights the ongoing threat posed by ISIS-Somalia, a group that, despite having a relatively small number of fighters, plays a key role in ISIS’s global financial and logistical operations. Based in Puntland’s Golis Mountains, the faction has drawn attention from U.S. counterterrorism forces, with several airstrikes targeting its leadership in recent years. The group has been linked to other cases of U.S.-based individuals seeking to join or support ISIS abroad.

Teekaye faces federal charges of attempting to provide material support to a terrorist organization, which could result in a sentence of up to 20 years in prison. His arrest underscores the persistent threat of domestic radicalization and the challenges law enforcement faces in preventing individuals from joining extremist groups.

The UK and the Netherlands are bracing for a potential surge in terrorism linked to escalating tensions in the Middle East. As Israel weighs a retaliatory strike against Iran, following a series of missile attacks, Western intelligence agencies are ringing alarm bells over a likely increase in terror activities on their own soil. This warning, issued by UK’s MI5 chief Ken McCallum, underscores how international conflicts can ripple across borders, amplifying security risks in Europe and elsewhere.

A Multi-Faceted Threat Landscape

The MI5 Director’s annual update highlights a worrying trend: the rise of external threats to the UK, originating from both state actors like Iran and Russia, and non-state extremist groups, including ISIS. While the UK has long dealt with terrorism, the current climate introduces a complex and evolving challenge, where state-sponsored plots are increasing in tandem with threats from radical Islamic terrorism.

According to McCallum, the UK has thwarted 20 Iranian plots in the last two years, reflecting Tehran’s increasing boldness in targeting foreign soil, including through assassination attempts. Iran’s retaliation strategies may extend to UK territory, especially if Israel escalates its conflict with Iranian-backed forces. This presents a serious concern for the UK, given its close ties with Israel and its involvement in global counterterrorism efforts.

The Middle East’s volatile situation, including Israel’s confrontations with Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, creates fertile ground for terror groups and rogue states to exploit. As tensions in the region rise, so does the risk of terror attacks, not just in the Middle East but globally. McCallum’s warnings suggest that the UK could become a target for those seeking to retaliate against the West’s perceived complicity with Israel.

Russia and Iran: State-Sponsored Chaos

McCallum’s speech sheds light on how state actors like Russia and Iran are increasingly using criminal networks to carry out “dirty work,” including sabotage, assassination, and espionage. This new form of hybrid warfare allows these nations to deny direct involvement while destabilizing foreign countries from within. Russia’s tactics, particularly since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, have leaned heavily on sowing chaos in Europe, including the UK. The expulsion of over 750 Russian diplomats—many identified as spies—since the invasion began is a testament to how deeply embedded Russian intelligence operatives have become in Western nations.

Iran’s involvement presents a different but equally significant challenge. Tehran’s use of proxy forces in the Middle East, combined with its increasing reliance on criminal networks for operations in Europe, makes it a formidable player in the UK’s threat landscape. Should Israel retaliate strongly against Iran or its allies, Tehran’s aggression could spill over, expanding its list of targets to include the UK.

Radical Islam and Far-Right Extremism

The MI5 chief’s report points to radical Islamic terrorism as a continuing dominant threat, accounting for 75% of the UK’s counterterrorism cases. Groups like ISIS have been weakened over the years but remain active, particularly in exploiting geopolitical conflicts to recruit and inspire lone-wolf attacks in Western nations. The escalating Israel-Hamas conflict, McCallum warns, could fuel Islamist terror groups’ propaganda and lead to a surge in attacks motivated by events in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the remaining 25% of UK’s counterterrorism efforts focus on the far-right. Although Islamist extremism garners much of the attention, far-right terrorism has been a growing concern. These groups often capitalize on divisive political climates, especially in the wake of terrorist attacks or immigration issues, to incite violence. The rise of far-right terrorism in Europe suggests that, just as radical Islamists are emboldened by international conflict, so too are extremists on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum.

The European Ripple Effect

The UK isn’t the only European nation raising the alarm. Norway has escalated its terrorism threat level to “high,” primarily in response to the Middle East conflict’s potential to inspire attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets. Nearby, Denmark and Sweden are grappling with incidents near Israeli diplomatic missions, further evidence that the repercussions of the Israeli-Iranian conflict are reverberating throughout Europe.

The fear is that, as the Middle East spirals into deeper conflict, it will trigger a wave of retaliatory terror attacks in Europe, with Jewish communities and Israeli interests as primary targets. This creates a sense of urgency for European intelligence agencies, which must now allocate more resources to counter potential attacks while continuing to manage internal security issues.

Ken McCallum’s warnings paint a grim picture of the UK’s security landscape. The intertwining of state-sponsored plots from Iran and Russia, coupled with the ever-present threat of radical Islamic terrorism, sets the stage for a dangerous period of heightened risk. The situation in the Middle East, particularly Israel’s conflict with Iranian-backed forces, has global implications that extend far beyond the region.

For the UK and its European neighbors, the question is no longer if terror threats will increase, but when and how severe they will be. Governments must brace for the worst, even as they work to prevent the ripple effects of conflict from reaching their shores.